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Undemocratic Restraint
Fred 0. Smith, Jr.*
For almost two hundred years, a basic tenet of American law has been
that federal courts must generally exercise jurisdiction when they possess it.
And yet, self-imposed prudential limits on judicial power have, at least until
recently, roared on despite these pronouncements. The judicial branch's
avowedly self-invented doctrines include some (though not all) aspects of
standing, ripeness, abstention, and the political question doctrine.
The Supreme Court recently, and unanimously, concluded that
prudential limits are in severe tension with our system of representative
democracy because they invite policy determinations from unelected judges.
Even with these pronouncements, however, the Court has not eliminated any of
these limits. Instead, the Court has recategorizedsome of these rules as matters
of statutory or constitutional interpretation.This raises an important question:
When the Court converts prudential limits into constitutionalor statutory rules,
do these conversions facilitate democracy?
This Article argues that recategorizingprudential rules does little to
facilitate representative democracy, and in particular, constitutionalizing
prudential limits raises acute democratic concerns. Constitutionalizing
jurisdictional limits reduces dialogue among the branches and exacerbates
some of the most troubling aspects of countermajoritarianjudicial supremacy.
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Further, constitutionalizingjudicial prudence has and will make it more
difficult for Congress to expand access to American courts for violations of
federal rights and norms. When measured against newly constitutionalized
limits on judicial power, American democracy is better served by self-imposed
judicial restraint,guided by transparency andprinciple.
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INTRODUCTION

[A] virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism lies at the core of
1
[some] devices of restraint.
-Gerald Gunther
Consider two oft-stated, but nonetheless contradictory, tenets of
federal judicial power. The first was articulated by Chief Justice John
Marshall almost two centuries ago in Cohens v. Virginia, and has often
been repeated since. Federal courts have "no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given." 2 The failure to hear such cases "would be treason to the
[C]onstitution." 3 More recently, the Court has reaffirmed that it is an
"undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the
Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the
constitutionally permissible bounds."4
In contrast to this "undisputed" obligation is another rather
entrenched tenet of federal jurisdiction: because prudence counsels
against resolving certain disputes, there are "judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction."' Guided by norms like
judicial restraint and federalism, federal courts routinely decline to
resolve certain disputes even when constitutional and statutory
1.
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "PassiveVirtues"-A Comment on Principleand
Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964).
2.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989) ("Our cases have long supported the
proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that
has been conferred."); Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) ("When a Federal court is
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such
jurisdiction. . . ." (citation omitted)); Chicot Cty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) ("[T]he
courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before
them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or
duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction." (citation omitted)).
3.
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404.
4.
New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359. Sometimes, the Court articulates a softer
version of this principle, contending that, at a minimum, "'a federal court's obligation to hear and
decide' cases within its jurisdiction 'is virtually unflagging.'" Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (quoting Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)); Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 590-91 (2013) (same);
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (same); cf. Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67,
71 (2009) ("While Chief Justice Marshall's statement bears 'fine tuning,' there is surely a starting
presumption that when jurisdiction is conferred, a court may not decline to exercise it." (citing
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 1061-62 (6th ed. 2009))).
5.
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
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jurisdictional requirements are met, invoking doctrines such as
prudential standing,6 prudential ripeness, 7 aspects of the political
question doctrine, 8 and abstention.9 This second tenet has come under
increased scrutiny by the Court in recent years-in large part because
it self-evidently conflicts with the first tenet. 10
Prudential limitations on federal judicial power have important
substantive and non-substantive features. Substantively, the various
doctrines purport to give life to constitutional norms like separation of
powers, due process, and federalism. Procedurally, the implementation
of prudential tests sometimes involves the transparent and flexible
balancing of constitutional principles." Further, perhaps the most

6.
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004) (finding that
a party lacked "prudential standing to bring this suit in federal court"), abrogated by Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
509 (1975) (calling "prudential standing" a "rule of judicial self-governance" that "is subject to
exceptions, the most prominent of which is that Congress may remove it by statute"); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (noting that the bar against third-party standing is judicially created,
and therefore subject to judicially crafted exceptions).
7.
Simmonds v. I.N.S., 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the functions of
"prudential ripeness"); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir.
2000) (defining the components of "prudential ripeness").
8.
See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 253 (2002) ("[T]he
prudential political question doctrine is not anchored in an interpretation of the Constitution itself,
but is instead a judge-made overlay that courts have used at their discretion to protect their
legitimacy and to avoid conflict with the political branches." (emphasis added)); see also Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 202 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that
political question doctrine has both constitutional and prudential dimensions). But see Corrie v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[D]isputes involving political questions lie
outside of the Article III jurisdiction of federal courts.").
9.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496, 501 (1941); ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 13.2 (6th ed. 2013)
(discussing academic debate about whether Younger announces a constitutional or prudential
rule). See generally Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction'sNoble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REv. 971, 990 (2009)
(discussing a range of areas where federal courts have discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction);
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (1985) (same); see also
Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction,99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1455-56 (2011) (explaining that
jurisdictional rules are more flexible than often assumed and proposing ways to apply different
blends of jurisdictional rules to different contexts depending on the values at stake).
10. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (concluding
that prudential standing is often a misnomer, and a potentially illegitimate one at that); Micah J.
Revell, PrudentialStanding, the Zone of Interests, and the New Jurisprudenceof Jurisdiction,63
EMORY L.J. 221 (2013) (setting out the issues ultimately decided in Lexmark). But see Duty Free
Ams., Inc. v. Estee Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1273 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that while
Lexmark "casts doubt on the future of prudential standing doctrines such as antitrust standing,"
"this discussion is dicta" in contexts beyond the Lanham Act).
11. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (observing that, in contrast to
constitutional limits,"[r]ules of prudential standing ...
are more flexible 'rule[s] . . . of federal
appellate practice'" (second ellipsis in original)); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976) (balancing factors and finding that they "clearly counsel[ed]
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important non-substantive feature of prudential limits is that, unlike
constitutional limits, prudential rules are common law doctrines that
Congress may override. 12
And so it is the law then that courts have an "undisputed"
obligation to hear cases whenever (or at least "virtually" whenever)
Congress and the Constitution have conferred jurisdiction. Failure to
do so is "treason" to the United States' highest legal charter. And it is
also the law that there are self-imposed limits on federal judicial power
when important prudential norms so counsel, regardless of whether
there is jurisdiction.1 3 If one takes seriously the Court's avowal that
that federal courts-have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise
jurisdiction when it is given, these prudential limits occupy a precarious
place.
In an opinion that one leading Federal Courts scholar has called
"Justice Scalia's Treatise on Prudential Standing,"1 4 the Court recently
addressed this apparent contradiction by expressing significant
skepticism about the very notion of prudential limits. After all, such
limits arguably undercut or subvert the role of the more politically
accountable body-Congress. "Just as a court cannot apply its
independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that
Congress has denied," Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in
2014, "it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely
because 'prudence' dictates." 15 Shortly after this pronouncement, the
Court observed that-to the extent the doctrine of "ripeness" has
prudential dimensions-this ripeness principle was also in "tension"
with its unflagging obligation to hear cases. 16
Even before these unanimous, sometimes categorical statements
portending the end of prudential limits, various Justices had written
opinions observing the tension between self-imposed limits on judicial
power on the one hand and federal courts' obligation to exercise
jurisdiction on the other. On the Court's left, Justice John Paul Stevens
against ... federal proceedings"); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-19 (1982) (adopting
an objective test for qualified immunity, but premising the test on the "balancing of competing
values").
12. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Congress may grant an express right of action
to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.").
13. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 545 (discussing this quandary and defending equitable and
common law limits on federal judicial power as ubiquitous and consistent with historical practice).
14. Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 149 (2014).
15. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388.
16. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014). Because the Court
found that the plaintiffs easily met these purportedly prudential requirements, however, it
ultimately did decide whether these limits were valid.
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observed in a 2006 concurrence that it was difficult to reconcile a
prudential "probate" exception to federal jurisdiction as anything other
than an "abdication of the obligation Chief Justice Marshall so famously
articulated."1 7 A generation earlier, Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall questioned the legitimacy of expansive versions of
Younger abstention, contending that the doctrine undermined
Congress's policy choices.18 And on the Court's right, as this Article will
describe in greater detail, Justice Antonin Scalia was the leading
judicial skeptic of prudential rules during his final years on the Court.
Critics of prudential limits do not always premise their
arguments on precedent or formalism alone; their skepticism is also
sometimes accompanied by normative appraisals of how prudential
limits undermine certain democratic values. These values include
deference to politically accountable bodies and transparency. 19 Justice
Scalia contended that prudential limits writ large are overly "judgeempowering" at the expense of democratically accountable bodies,
"thereby distort[ing] the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the
Executive and the Legislature." 20 He also charged in a 2013 dissent that
"[r]elegating a jurisdictional requirement to 'prudential' status is a
wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever
they believe it 'prudent'-which is to say, a good idea." 2 1
This Article assesses the Court's recent efforts to translate these
democratic critiques into law. Importantly, the Court has not
eliminated these limits. Rather, as a descriptive matter, the Court has
sought to recategorize prudential limits through two doctrinal moves.
First, the Court has recast formerly "prudential" limits as matters of
statutory interpretation. 2 2 Second, the Court has treated formerly
prudential limits as constitutional. 23

17. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 316 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring).
18. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The crystal clarity of
the congressional decision and purpose in adopting § 1983, and the unbroken line of this Court's
cases enforcing that decision, expose . . . today's decision as deliberate and conscious floutings of a
decision Congress was constitutionally empowered to make.").
19. See Gunther, supra note 1, at 5-6.
20.
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 635-36 (2007) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974)).
21.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-87 (2014).
23.
Compare Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79-80 (1997) (treating
the question of who can represent a state's interests in federal court as a matter of state law), Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (treating the bar against taxpayer standing as nonconstitutional and
self-imposed), and Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (same), with Hein, 551 U.S. at 597-600
(grounding the bar in Article III), and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013)
(grounding a state-agent rule in Article III).
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As a normative matter, this Article argues these two moves often
do little to enhance the democratic values that sometimes attend
condemnations of various prudential limits. Further-if one accepts
some of the leading democratic accounts of judicial review and access to
justice-recasting prudential limits as constitutional ironically
undermines democratic values. In conflict with academic accounts of
judicial review that often emphasize the importance of encouraging
dialogue
between
the
various
branches
of
government,
constitutionalizing jurisdictional limits can decrease the potential for
dialogue between courts and Congress. 24 Where Professor Alexander
Bickel once advocated for justiciability doctrines on the ground that
they could reduce imprudent instances of countermajoritarian judicial
review, 25 constitutionalizing limits on judicial power invites
constitutional review of democratically enacted jurisdictional
legislation. 26 Where Dean John Hart Ely once encouraged judicial
review that reinforces representative government, constitutionalizing
prudence encourages the invalidation of laws that are not self-evidently
related to that goal.
There is a common pattern with respect to the dialogues and
laws impacted by the constitutionalization of prudential limits, a
pattern that invites its own set of democratic concerns. Scholars such
as Judith Resnik have emphasized the relationship between democracy
and access to courts. 27 Open and wide access to courts affirms the
equality and dignity of each individual, ensuring accountability in the
private and public spheres alike. 28 And yet, constitutionalization of
jurisdictional limits primarily locks Congress out of attempts to expand
access to courts-at least when the Constitution's jurisdictional
restrictions are expanded or interpreted robustly. In the area of
justiciability, the Court has limited the reach of statutes like the
Endangered Species Act and, this past Supreme Court Term, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. 2 9 In addition, third-party standing's status as
prudential, rather than constitutional, is why Congress is capable of
abrogating that limit in laws like the Fair Housing Act.

24.

See infra Part III.

25.
See e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

26. See infra Part IV.
27. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: "Open Courts,"'Terror Trials,"and Public
Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 6 (2011); Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Inventing
Democratic Courts:A New and Iconic Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 207, 232-33 (2013).
28. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65
EMORY L.J. 1657 (2016).
29. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016).
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Relatedly, the tale of sovereign immunity should serve as a
cautionary note as to the effect of constitutionalizing a limit on federal
jurisdiction. The Court's choice to treat sovereign immunity as
constitutional rather than a common law or prudential doctrine has
contributed to why, despite Congress's unambiguous efforts, there are
markedly few opportunities for the disabled, the elderly, and aggrieved
workers to bring suits against states under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the selfcare provision of the Family Medical Leave Act, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 30 Converting prudential limits into constitutional ones,
while restricting the scope of the constitutional jurisdiction itself, spells
trouble for some congressionally created causes of action and
opportunities to enforce those statutes in federal court.
Part I defines "prudential limits" and provides a taxonomy of
those limits in contemporary jurisprudence. Despite the notion that
federal courts have a virtually unwavering obligation to hear cases,
prudential limits on judicial power have characterized a significant
swath of federal jurisdictional doctrines over the past half-century. The
Part also discusses the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, an area of
law that is not generally thought of as "prudential," but one that some
scholars and jurists have argued should be treated in a way that mirrors
prudential norms. This Part reveals that the boundaries between
constitutional, prudential, and statutory limits are not generally fixed;
they are often blurred, porous, and contested.
Part II identifies the most significant defenses of and attacks on
judicial prudence. Most notably, this Part discusses Justice Scalia's
success in translating at least one of these critiques into law during his
final years on the Court: the notion that prudential limits are
undemocratic and illegitimate.
The following three parts appraise the Court's efforts to recast
"prudential" limits. Part III assesses the dialogue between the various
branches that prudential limits have inspired and explores whether
constitutional limits would have facilitated similar dialogues. Part IV
demonstrates that constitutionalizing prudential limits on judicial
power sometimes exacerbates the countermajoritarian difficulty. Part
V examines dialogues the Court has inspired when it has treated limits
on jurisdiction as statutory. All three parts illustrate that
constitutionalizing prudence has the most profound effect on
congressional efforts to expand access to federal courts.
On balance, the Article concludes that constitutionalizing
formerly prudential limits deserves particular scrutiny because those
30.

See infra Part III.
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efforts entrench such limits, thereby blocking electorally accountable
branches from expanding access to courts. The notion that
constitutionalizing prudential limits enhances democracy is unproven
and unlikely.
I. UNDERSTANDING PRUDENCE

This Part has three aims. First, in the tradition of Professor
31 this Part
David Shapiro's 1985 classic Jurisdiction and Discretion,
provides an updated primer on prudential limits on federal judicial
power, which is defined here as a self-imposed, common law limit on
federal jurisdiction designed to foster core values like federalism,
separation of powers, and accuracy. Despite the judicial resurgence of
the view that federal courts have an unflagging obligation to hear cases
within their jurisdiction, self-imposed limits on federal judicial power
are rather common. 32 The test for inclusion in this Part is that (1) the
United States Supreme Court has at times called the doctrine
prudential or (2) that both scholars and some members of the Supreme
Court have labeled it either as prudential or as a common law limitation
on federal judicial power. The first part of this test leads to a discussion
of standing, ripeness, adverseness, and Pullman abstention. The second
part of this test leads to a discussion of the political question doctrine,
Younger abstention, and state sovereign immunity, which a majority of
the Court has never held to be prudential.
Second, this descriptive account is layered with an analytic one:
the proverbial boundaries dividing "self-imposed" prudential limits,
constitutional limits, and statutory limits are often blurred, porous, and
contested.
Third, some of these liminal limits have shifted-or are at risk
of shifting-from prudential to constitutional doctrines. Two doctrines
that have fully undergone that conversion are the bar against federal
courts' entertaining generalized grievances and the related bar against
taxpayer standing. Further, some scholars have advocated treating
Younger abstention as constitutional rather than prudential as a way
of easing democratic objections to that doctrine. And, despite some
jurists' protestations that extra-textual limits on sovereign immunity
are best understood as sounding in common law or prudence, the
Supreme Court has opted instead to treat these limits as constitutional.

31.
32.

Shapiro, supra note 9.
See infra Part II.
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A. Defining Prudence
Prudential limits on federal judicial power bear four common
features. The first is that federal courts adopt them as a matter of
prudence; they are not imposed by the Constitution or Congress. 33
Second, prudential limitations involve threshold inquiries, technically
separate from the merits, and often considered alongside traditional
jurisdictional issues like subject matter jurisdiction.34 This is not to say
that judicial avoidance strategies end at this threshold stage of
litigation. As Professor Daryl Levinson has observed, concepts like
federalism and separation of powers often animate remedial
considerations as well. 3 5 And as Professor Richard Fallon has noted, the
available remedy may influence courts' decisions about whether to
exercise jurisdiction. 36 Still, to the extent a doctrine is itself about a
remedy rather than the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction at a
threshold stage, such devices of restraint are not generally labeled
"prudential."
Third, the term "prudential" is generally used to describe limits
on a court's so-called "mandatory," 3 7 rather than entirely discretionary,
jurisdiction. For example, when the Supreme Court opts not to hear a
case through its discretionary certiorari process, neither scholars nor
courts generally refer to these moments as "prudential" limits. Fourth,
as common law doctrines, prudential limitations are reversible by
Congress.38

33.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004), abrogatedby Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377
(2014).
34.
Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of JurisdictionalResequencing in the Federal Courts,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 85-86, 89-90 (2001) (describing the role of prudential rules in the initial
threshold determination a court makes as to which issues to take on first); Alan M. Trammell,
JurisdictionalSequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1124 (2013) (describing abstention doctrines' place
with respect to the initial sequencing decisions).
35. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 889-99 (1999).
36. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciabilityand Remedies-and Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 639 (2006).
37.
One of David Shapiro's illuminating insights is that even with respect to "mandatory"
jurisdiction, courts must often exercise discretion as to how and when to employ that jurisdiction.
See Shapiro, supra note 9.
38.
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991) ("Congress may grant an express right of
action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules." (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975))); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structureof Standing, 98 YALE
L.J. 221, 230-31 (1988) (observing this feature of prudential rules).
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B. Identifying Prudence
1. Standing
The doctrine of standing has long been thought to have both
constitutional and nonconstitutional dimensions. 39 Treatises and cases
often recognize the case of Allen v. Wright as identifying the
demarcation between where constitutional jurisdictional requirements
end and self-imposed limits on federal judicial power begin. Allen placed
three requirements on the Article III side of the line and another three
on the prudential side. This symmetrical clarity found its way into
books, articles, and Federal Courts syllabi. 40 The constitutional
requirements are, as now-judge William Fletcher noted, "numbingly
familiar." 4 1 A plaintiff must demonstrate that she has an (1) an injury,
(2) that has been caused by the defendant's conduct, and (3) that can be
redressed in a judicial forum. And if a plaintiff seeks an injunction or
declaration, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she is likely to be
harmed again in the future.
There are at least three aspects of standing that have often been
described as sounding in judicial self-restraint. The first is the general
bar against "third-party standing." As early as 1907, the Court
concluded that even an injured party may not bring a claim unless she
"belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is
given, or the class primarily protected." 42 This bar is commonly
understood to be a self-imposed rule. 4 3 As the Court explained in
Barrows v. Jackson, the bar against third-party standing is "only a rule
of practice," albeit a "salutary" one.44 Relying on the third-party39.
For example, in the 1923 case of Frothinghamv. Mellon, the Supreme Court announced
a general rule against allowing a person's status as a taxpayer to furnish a sufficient basis to
challenge the constitutionality of congressional acts. 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923). And for a time,
case law and scholarship understood this holding as a nonconstitutional, self-imposed limitation
on federal judicial power. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-94 (1968) (referencing supporting
scholarship).
40. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 104.
41. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 222.
42. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907); see also Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 256 (1953) ('There are still other cases in which the Court has held that even though
a party will suffer a direct substantial injury from application of a statute, he cannot challenge its
constitutionality unless he can show that he is within the class whose constitutional rights are
allegedly infringed.").
43. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-29 (2004) (calling third-party standing
prudential); see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387
n.3 (2014) (observing that "most" Supreme Court cases about third-party standing characterize it
this way).
44. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257; see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges
and Third-PartyStanding, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1359 (2000) ("The rule disfavoring third-party
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standing bar's prudential nature, the Court has crafted two
exceptions. 45 The first is that a plaintiff may raise another person's
constitutional injuries if the latter is hindered from raising her own
claim in court. 46 Under the second exception, a court will entertain a
suit where there is a "close relationship" between the plaintiff and the
person who has suffered (or is suffering) the deprivation of a
constitutional right. 47
The bar against third-party standing is not the only limitation
on judicial power that the Court has described as prudential. A second
limit the Court has described this way is that a plaintiffs claim should
meet the zone of interests test. 48 That is, "apart from the 'case' or
'controversy' test," the Supreme Court explained in Association of Data
ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp, 49 the "zone of interests
test" looks to "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."50
Courts have often applied this limitation in cases that involve
challenges
to
administrative
regulatory
action under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 1
The classification of the zone of interests test as "prudential,"
however, is in serious doubt. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 52 which is described in greater detail in Part
II, the Court held that imposing a prudential bar to standing that
outpaced a congressional statute undermines democracy. 53
standing has never been absolute; the Supreme Court has often characterized it as 'prudential'
and thus, apparently, as discretionary."); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 277, 289 (1984).
45. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 258. Justice Thomas recently took aim at these two exceptions,
charging that they were possibly too capacious and too flexible. Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2322 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 258.
47.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.3. Chemerinsky also cites a third exception, the
overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases. Id.
48. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
49. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
50. Id. at 153-54.
51. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
52.
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014).
53. Lower courts have, correctly, understood Lexmark to mean that the zone of interests test
is a now a mode of interpreting statutes. Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J, 805
F.3d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[I]n Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
the Supreme Court criticized the placement of the zone-of-interests requirement within the rubric
of prudential standing."); Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir.
2015) ("But last year, in Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the [C]ourt
rejected the 'prudential standing' label and made clear that whether a plaintiffs claims are within
a statute's zone of interests is not a jurisdictional question.").
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Third, federal courts may not hear cases deemed "generalized
grievances."5 4 As the Court explained in Federal Election Commission
v. Akins, "[T]he political process, rather than the judicial process, may
provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance." 55
In cases like Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court characterized this bar
as a prudential, rather than a constitutional, limit. It must be noted,
however, that the Court has not always been consistent about whether
this limit is merely prudential. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Court described the bar against generalized grievances as
constitutional. 5 6 But then in Akins, the Court articulated avowed
agnosticism as to whether the generalized-grievance bar sounds in the
Constitution or elsewhere. 51 But most recently, in Lexmark, the Court
again insisted in dictum that Article III mandates the bar against
generalized grievances, effectively ensuring the doctrine's conversion
from a prudential limit into a constitutional limit.58 "While we have at

times grounded our reluctance to entertain such suits in the counsels of
prudence," the Court acknowledged in Lexmark, "we have since held
that such suits do not present constitutional 'cases' or 'controversies.' "59
Another aspect of standing, one that is perhaps intertwined with
the bar against generalized grievances, is the Court's presumptive
refusal to hear cases against the government when the plaintiffs injury
is that her tax dollars are being used in an unconstitutional way. In
Flast v. Cohen, a case in which plaintiffs challenged federal
expenditures under the Establishment Clause, the Court characterized
this judicial limitation as a prudential one.6 0 More recently, however,
the Court constitutionalized the taxpayer-standing doctrine and cited
democratic norms while doing so. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc., 61 the Court addressed whether a taxpayer could
challenge a federal executive department's religious expenditure (as
opposed to a congressional appropriation of the sort at issue in Flast).
It concluded that a taxpayer may not do so, treating this question as
54. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
55. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).
56. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
57. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing,
the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the
political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a
widely shared grievance.").
58. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014).
59. Id. (citing Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam); DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344-46 (2006); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
60.
551 U.S. 587 (2007).
61.
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one of "Article III standing." 62 The Court defended its choice in part on
democratic grounds: "Relaxation of standing requirements is directly
related to the expansion of judicial power, and lowering the taxpayer
standing bar to permit challenges of purely executive actions would
significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a
shift away from a democratic form of government." 63 Justice Scalia
concurred, noting that the prudential nature of Flast rendered it overly
"judge-empowering" in a way that undermined the judiciary's proper
place in our constitutional democracy.64
2. Adverseness
Another prudential requirement is that a federal case must have
adverse parties. 65 This sometimes means that even when parties
advance different positions, and even where there is an injured plaintiff
who will benefit from judicial intervention, the court may nonetheless
decline to hear a claim if the defendant has an insufficient stake in the
result.6 6 More often, however, it means that parties may not advance
identical legal positions or seek identical judgments. 67
The case of United States v. Windsor provides a salient recent
example of this principle, while also highlighting the Court's
disagreement about whether adverseness is a constitutional or
prudential requirement. 68 Edith Windsor, a widow, alleged that the
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") violated the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection under the law. 69 DOMA, among other
things, prohibited the federal government from recognizing any statesanctioned same-sex marriage.7 0 This directly impacted Windsor
because the government required her to pay federal estate taxes after
the passing of her spouse-taxes she would not have had to pay had her
spouse been a man.7 1 The federal government refused to refund her
estate taxes in the absence of a federal court order. Still, both she and
62.
Id. at 600.
63.
Id. at 611 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 635-36 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65.
Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 46 F.3d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1995); Fin.
Guar. Ins. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 943 F.2d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 1991); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3530 (3d ed. 2016) ("The principle remains today that
if both parties affirmatively desire the same result, no justiciable case is presented.").
66. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 3530.
67.
See, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971).
68.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
69. Id. at 2682.
70.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
71.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
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the federal government insisted that DOMIA was unconstitutional, and
the parties advanced that position at the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and at the Supreme Court.72 Therefore, throughout the
appellate process, Windsor and the government advanced the same
legal position and sought an identical judgment. 73
All nine members of the Supreme Court therefore took the view
that the parties were not adverse, but the Justices did not agree as to
whether this presented a fatal flaw in the case. The majority identified
the principles that undergird the adverseness requirement. 74 These
principles include the need to guard against cases in which there is no
controversy, as well as the need for crisp presentation of competing
legal positions. These concerns were not present in Windsor. DONIA had
a direct impact on Windsor and thousands of other families. Further,
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group had provided briefing and
argument defending DOMA.

75

By contrast, Justice Scalia's dissent argued that adverseness
was a constitutional requirement and as such could not easily be wished
away, competing values notwithstanding. 76 He traced the doctrine of
adverseness to the long-standing rule against entirely feigned or
collusive suits. 7 7 He cited Lord v. Veazie, in which the Court said, "It is
the office of courts of justice to decide the rights of persons and of
property, when the persons interested cannot adjust them by
agreement between themselves." 7 The Lord Court famously added that
seeking a judgment when there "is no real and substantial controversy"
is an "abuse . . . [of] courts of justice."7 9 Relying on this precedent and
its progeny, Justice Scalia argued that absent two parties with
contradictory legal positions and goals, there is no controversy at all
within the meaning of Article 111.80

3. Ripeness
Under the doctrine of "ripeness," federal courts decline to hear
cases that are insufficiently mature to warrant adjudication. This

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 2684.
Id.
Id. at 2688.
Id.
Id. at 2697, 2701.
Id. at 2703.
49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1850).
Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2703.
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doctrine has constitutional, prudential, and statutory dimensions.8 1 As
a constitutional matter, the question is whether a plaintiffs injury is
sufficiently imminent so as to form a "case or controversy" under Article
III. Like standing, this constitutional doctrine "prevents courts from
declaring the meaning of the law in a vacuum and from constructing
generalized legal rules unless the resolution of an actual dispute
requires it."82
By contrast, prudential ripeness is "a tool that courts may use to
enhance the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid becoming
embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to be unnecessary or
may require premature examination of, especially, constitutional issues
that time may make easier or less controversial." 83 The Court has used
the term "prudential ripeness" to describe an exhaustion requirement
in Takings Clause cases. 84 The more commonly cited two features of
prudential ripeness are that a case be "fit" for judicial resolution and
that the plaintiff can demonstrate that she will experience "hardship"
absent judicial intervention. 85 For the purposes of challenges to
governmental agencies governed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
the ripeness inquiry also has a statutory component. When determining
whether an agency issue is "fit" for judicial review, courts regularly
consider whether an agency action is "final" within the meaning of

§

704.86

81.
Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (observing that
ripeness doctrine is "drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential
reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction" (citing Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S.
43, 57 n.18 (1993))); see also Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d
139, 148 (7th Cir. 2011).
82.
Simmonds v. I.N.S., 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
83.
Id.(citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 58-64 (1961)).
84. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1013 (1992); see also Horne v. Dep't of
Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013).
85.
See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (explaining that ripeness
doctrine seeks "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements," which requires looking to "both the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration");
see also Verizon New Eng., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 2322, 651 F.3d 176, 18889 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying these two factors); Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning,
522 F.3d 1153, 1164 (11th Cir. 2008) (same); McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70
(1st Cir. 2003) (same); Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1037-40
(8th Cir. 2000) (same).
86.
See., e.g., Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 68 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Still, much like prudential standing, the Court has recently
called prudential ripeness into doubt.87 The Court unanimously
observed in 2014 that, to the extent the doctrine of "ripeness" has
prudential components, the doctrine is in "tension with" its obligation
to hear cases. 88 Courts and commentators have interpreted this
language as undermining the longevity of prudential ripeness.8 9
4. Political Question Doctrine
As Professor Tara Grove recently observed, unlike doctrines like
standing and ripeness, the political question doctrine does more than
govern the circumstances in which a federal court can entertain a
case. 90 Instead, the doctrine takes certain questions off of the table
entirely. 91 Scholars sometimes trace the doctrine to Chief Justice John
Marshall's statement in Marbury v. Madison, where he explained,
"Questions, in their nature political, or which are by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." 92
Roughly a half-century later, in Luther v. Borden, the Court relied on
the political question doctrine when declining to resolve a post-rebellion
dispute involving two factions in Rhode Island.93 Under the traditional
narrative, Luther stands for the proposition that the Constitution's
Guarantee Clause 94 is a non-justiciable political question. 95
87. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014); see also WRIGHT ET
AL., supranote 65, § 8418.
88. Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2347.
89. See, e.g., Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 2014) ("Thus, the Supreme Court has
cast into some doubt 'the continuing vitality' of the long-established prudential aspects of the
ripeness doctrine, specifically the aspects that concern hardship to the parties and fitness of the
dispute for resolution."); Nora Coon, Ripening Green Litigation: The Case for Deconstitutionalizing
Ripeness in Environmental Law, 45 ENVTL. L. 811, 834-36 (2015) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
raised doubts about the future of prudential ripeness. . . . If the Court later holds that the
prudential ripeness doctrine is dead, it will have significant implications for the environmental
cases heard by federal courts." (citation omitted)); see also Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying a
PrudentialSolution to the Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L. REV. 163, 175-76 (2014)
("Interestingly, the Supreme Court has quite recently thrown some quantity of cold water on the
propriety of prudential ripeness (and, indeed, all prudential justiciability doctrines).").
90. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1908, 1915 (2015).
91. The doctrine may not be, then, what Henry Monaghan once called a "who" or "when" rule
of federal jurisdiction, so much as it as a "whether" rule. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973).
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 8426 ("The Court
first spoke of political questions in Marbury v. Madison.").
93. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 33-35 (1849).
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government).
95. Barkow, supranote 8, at 255; Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct
Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 648 (2014). However, Professor Tara Leigh Grove has recently,
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In the mid-twentieth century, in Baker v. Carr, the Court
purported to provide a series of factors to assist in determining whether
a case amounts to a political question.96 These six factors are: (1) "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department"; (2) "a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion"; (4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government"; (5) "an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made"; and (6)
"the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question." 97
Still, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently observed, "Baker left
unanswered when the presence of one or more factors warrants
dismissal, as well as the interrelationship of the six factors and the
relative importance of each in determining whether a case is suitable
for adjudication." 98 And as such, it is far from settled whether the
political question doctrine sounds in Article III or in judicial
self-restraint. Lower courts sometimes suggest that even if prudence
informs aspects of analysis under the political question doctrine, the
Constitution itself is the arbiter of whether something is a nonjusticiable political question. 99 Others characterize the doctrine as

and persuasively, challenged that reading. Grove, supra note 90, at 1924-25 ("[A] closer look
reveals that the Court in Luther issued no such holding; in fact, Luther was, in most respects, a
traditional political question case."). Dean John Hart Ely called Guarantee Clause jurisprudence
an "unfortunate doctrine" that extended a proper holding in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849), to contexts in which political question considerations were less relevant. See JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 118 n.* (1980); see also Risser v.

Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "this result has been powerfully
criticized," but that "it is too well entrenched to be overturned at our level of the judiciary").
96. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
97.

Id.

98.

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 202 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring).

99.
Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is at bottom a
jurisdictional limitation imposed on the courts by the Constitution, and not by the judiciary
itself."); 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of the Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218
F.3d 152, 164 (2d. Cir. 2000) ("Although prudential considerations may inform a court's
justiciability analysis, the political question doctrine is essentially a constitutional limitation on
the courts."). There is some support for this view in Supreme Court precedent. Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) ("[T]he concept of justiciability, which
expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the 'case or controversy'
requirement of Art. III, embodies ... political question doctrine[ ].").

2017]

UNDEMOCRATIC RESTRAINT

863

prudential. 100 And other jurists take a middle view, suggesting that
some aspects of the political question doctrine sound in the
Constitution, while other aspects are prudential.101
5. Abstention
Pullman. The earliest
form of abstention-Pullman
abstention-is a "judge-made doctrine ... first fashioned in 1941 in
RailroadCommission of Texas v. Pullman Co." 10 2 The doctrine involves
dismissing or staying federal constitutional challenges when the
resolution of an unclear question of state law would obviate the need to
reach that federal constitutional question. 103 In such instances, state
courts are to resolve unclear questions of state law. Pullman itself
involved a legal challenge to a Texas regulation that facially
discriminated against black Americans who worked on railcars.1 0 4
Though a federal district court judge enjoined the practice, the Supreme
Court reversed. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous
Court, acknowledged that the case involved "a substantial
constitutional issue" that "touch[ed] a sensitive area of social policy."10 5
But antecedent to that sensitive constitutional question was whether
the commission overstepped its legal authority under state law by
implementing the regulation. As such, the Court reasoned,
"[C]onstitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive
ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy." 10 6 Because
resolving the state-law question would obviate the need to reach the
federal constitutional question, and because the state-law question was
unclear and unresolved, the case should have been dismissed or stayed
until a state court had an opportunity to clarify state law. 107

100. Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("The political question doctrine
deprives federal courts of jurisdiction, based on prudential concerns, over cases which would
normally fall within their purview."); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (calling it
a "nonjurisdictional, prudential doctrine[ ]").
101. See Zivoto/sky, 566 U.S. at 202 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co.
v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
102. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)).
103. See id.
104. Under the practice, whites served as "conductors" of trains with more than one sleeping
car, whereas blacks served as "porters." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497.
105. Id. at 498.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 501. The doctrine has faced controversy. See David P. Currie, The Federal Courts
and the American Law Institute, Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) ("[T]he delays and
added cost of [Pullman] abstention ... give the practice a Bleak House aspect that in my mind is
too high a price to pay for the gains in avoiding error, friction, and constitutional questions.").
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While this rule persists today,10 8 it primarily operates through a
process called "certification." 109 Forty-eight states have adopted
procedures that permit respective state courts to entertain requests
from federal courts to answer questions of state law.110 A recent
memorable example of this came during the same-sex marriage
litigation, in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked the
California Supreme Court whether, as a matter of state law, proponents
of statewide initiatives may defend those initiatives in state court when
elected officials decline to do so.1 11
Younger. In Younger v. Harris, the Court reasoned that "Our
Federalism" could not countenance federal injunctions against ongoing
criminal proceedings in state court. 112 Over time, the doctrine has come
to mean that federal courts may not issue relief that unduly interferes
with (1) ongoing criminal proceedings, (2) civil enforcement proceedings
that resemble criminal proceedings, or (3) "civil proceedings involving
certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to
perform their judicial functions." 113
Whether Younger abstention is better understood as prudential
or constitutional is subject to confusion and debate. When directly
confronted with the issue, federal courts have generally described the
doctrine as prudential. 1 14 In support of this view, Professors Steven
Calabresi and Gary Lawson have argued that Younger abstention is an
equitable doctrine, and, as such, can and should be recalibrated to
achieve the proper balance of remedies for victims of unconstitutional
conduct.11 5 By contrast, Professor Calvin Massey has argued that
108. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (describing the doctrine). In that opinion, Justice
Scalia perhaps showed an early sign of his eventual open skepticism with prudential limitations
on judicial power as a category, urging that the term "deferral" was more accurate and evocative
to describe the doctrine than "abstention." Id. at 42 n. 1.
109. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997) ("Certification today
covers territory once dominated by a deferral device called 'Pullman abstention,' after the
generative case. . . .").
110. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 12.3 (noting that only Arkansas and North Carolina lack
certification procedures and that Missouri's constitution prevents its certification statute from
taking root).
111. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1124 (Cal. 2011).
112. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
113. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 586 (2013) (alteration in original) (citing
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).
114. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003)
("Younger is not ... based on Article III requirements, but instead a prudential limitation on the
court's exercise of jurisdiction grounded in equitable considerations of comity."); Benavidez v. Eu,
34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Younger abstention ... reflects a court's prudential decision not
to exercise jurisdiction which it in fact possesses .... ).
115. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy:Reflections on the Harris
Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 256 (1992).
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Younger abstention is a constitutionally based doctrine. 116 As evidence,
he points to the interplay between the Anti-Injunction Act and Younger
abstention. The Anti-Injunction Act bars federal courts from enjoining
state court proceedings absent, among other exceptions, an express
authorization by Congress. 117 The Supreme Court has held that the
Anti-Injunction Act does not bar courts from issuing injunctive or
declaratory relief for federal constitutional violations because 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983 provides an express exception that permits such relief. 118 If
Younger abstention is prudential, Massey notes, then it is presumably
abrogated by § 1983.119 The doctrine's continued vitality, § 1983
notwithstanding, suggests that Younger abstention is not a prudential
doctrine. Massey further contends that understanding Younger
abstention as constitutional helps guard it against Professor Martin
Redish's charge that Younger's persistence is an undemocratic "judicial
usurpation of legislative authority." 120 Redish's argument that Younger
is a prudential undemocratic power-grab, and Massey's response that
treating Younger as constitutional eases the problem, exemplifies the
phenomenon at the heart of this Article.
6. Government Immunities
An accounting of the origins, scope, and proper way to classify
these various governmental immunities warrants its own Article. In
previous work, I have argued that while the Court characterizes the bar
against respondeat superior liability for local governments as statutory,
it is better understood as a judicially crafted doctrine designed to
protect federalism interests. 121 For the purposes of this Article, I will
discuss the various approaches to categorizing state sovereign
immunity.
Some readers may be skeptical that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity belongs in an article about prudential norms. Still, like
aspects of abstention and the political question doctrine, in the absence
of a constitutional mandate, it is a self-imposed, threshold doctrine of
restraint that Congress may abrogate. Even if we do not typically label

116. Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the ConstitutionalLimits of the JudicialPower of the
United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811, 813.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
118. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
119. Massey, supranote 116, at 841.
120. Id. (quoting Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 114 (1984)).
121. Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 486-87 (2016).
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it "prudential," perhaps we should. 122 Further, if nothing else, the
changing nature of sovereign immunity helps us think about the
democratic consequences of shifting a doctrine from one Congress can
abrogate to one that it often cannot.
Under current doctrine, state sovereign immunity is mandated
by the structure of the Constitution. 123 The Eleventh Amendment
reads, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." 124 Read literally, the words could mean
that Article III's grant of diversity jurisdiction "shall not be construed
to extend" to suits by a private party against a state. 125 Or, according to
other scholars, the words could mean that a person may never launch a
federal lawsuit against a state in which they are not a resident. 126
But the doctrine associated with the Amendment extends far
beyond its literal meaning. 127 This is true in at least six ways. First, as
the Court ruled in Hans v. Louisiana, the provision applies to cases
sounding in federal question jurisdiction, even when plaintiffs sue their
own state. 12 8 If the words were interpreted literally, the Court has
explained, this would arguably undermine this amendment's historical

122. Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People's Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitution'sRepublican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1996-97 (2012) (contending
that the extratextual aspects of sovereign immunity are "prudential").
123. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
125. William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1274 (1989) (favoring this interpretation of the amendment); John
J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004 (1983) ("Neither federal question cases nor admiralty cases fit within
[the Amendment's] language, within the intention of its framers, or within the interpretation that
the Court consistently gave it prior to the constitutional crisis of 1877."); James E. Pfander, History
and State Suability: An "Explanatory"Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1269, 1323-52 (1998) (contending that the amendment was an "explanatory amendment,"
designed to shield states from liability for debts accrued under the Articles of Confederation).
126. Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1342, 1346 (1989).
127. Smith, supra note 121, at 1969 ("Despite the long-running disagreement between
proponents of the plain meaning thesis and proponents of the diversity thesis, there is at least one
point on which they agree. The text of the Eleventh Amendment says nothing about a citizen suing
her own state for violations of federal law.").
128. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890). Some jurists have contended that even this
ruling rested on nonconstitutional grounds. Emps. of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v.
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 314 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Hans opinion as an entirety can sensibly be read as resting the judgment squarely upon the ancient
nonconstitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity.").
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underpinnings. 1 2 9 Second, as the Court ruled in Principalityof Monaco
v. Mississippi, a foreign country may not sue a state in federal court. 130
The Court explained that "[b]ehind the words of the [Eleventh
Amendment] are postulates which limit and control," 131 including the
postulate that states entered the union with sovereignty. Third, despite
the general rule that state courts may not discriminate against federal
claims, 1 3 2 state courts may refuse to entertain cases against a state that
would be barred in federal court. 133
Fourth, Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity and permit
suits against states when acting pursuant to its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority. 134 Fifth, states may consent to
suit. 13 5 Sixth, individuals may sue state officials in their official
capacity for prospective relief to stop the violation of a federal right. 136
The Court recently considered whether to add a seventh extratextual
dimension: that a person cannot sue State A in the courts of State B,
regardless of what State B's law says about the question. It divided 4-4
on this question. 137
There is long-standing disagreement about the best way to
understand or characterize sovereign immunity's extratextual
dimensions. While current doctrine holds that the structure of the
Constitution demands these limits, this view has by no means been
unanimous. Some scholars and jurists have contended that the doctrine
is better understood as a nonconstitutional doctrine that Congress may
abrogate, regardless of whether Congress is acting pursuant to the

129. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999) ("The text and history of the Eleventh
Amendment also suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the original
constitutional design.").
130. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330-32 (1934).
131. Id. at 322-23.
132. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 729-30 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372
(1990); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150-51 (1988); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947).
For a helpful discussion of this line of cases, see Charlton C. Copeland, FederalLaw in State Court:
Judicial Federalism Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511-90 (2011).
133. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
134. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976) (holding that Congress may abrogate state
sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its powers granted in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).

135. Katherine Florey, Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case Against Treating State
Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1417-31 (2004); Caleb
Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine ofPersonalJurisdiction,115 HARv. L. REV. 1559, 161617 (2002).
136. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908).
137. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2016).
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Fourteenth Amendment. In scholarship, Professor Martha Field was a
pioneering proponent of this view. 1 3 8
In judicial opinions, two early proponents of this view were
Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Brennan. In Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri v. Department of
Public Health & Welfare of Missouri, the Court confronted whether
states could be held liable for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). 13 9 The Court held that, absent a clear statement from
Congress, it was unprepared to hold that the FLSA intended to impose
liability on offending states. 140 Writing in concurrence, Justice Marshall
noted that alongside the precisely delineated strictures of the Eleventh
Amendment rested a shadow sovereign immunity jurisprudence based
on the common law. 141 Justice Brennan's solo dissent adopted a similar
position, contending that the case involved a "nonconstitutional
immunity from suit by its own citizens." 142
By the early 1990s, no fewer than three Justices held the view
that, beyond the words of the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign
immunity was a nonconstitutional common law doctrine that Congress
could abrogate. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court
invalidated a provision that abrogated sovereign immunity under the
Indian Gaming Regulation Act. 143 The Court reasoned that the Act was
passed pursuant to Congress's Article I powers, rather than its power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 144 Four Justices dissented,
relying in part on sovereign immunity's common law basis. In a dissent
joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, Justice Souter contended that,
beyond the words of the Eleventh Amendment, precedent supported
only a "nonconstitutional common-law immunity." 145 The extratextual
dimensions of sovereign immunity are akin to doctrines that are
"prudential in nature and therefore not unalterable by Congress." 146
Justice Stevens's solo dissent expressed agreement on that point:
"Congress has the power to deny the States and their officials the right
to rely on the nonconstitutional defense of sovereign immunity in an
138. Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 544 (1978) ("A common law view of sovereign immunity ... fits
better with the eleventh amendment's wording than does a constitutional view[.]").
139. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
140. Id. at 285.
141. Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He repeated this view in his dissent in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125-26 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
144. See id. at 72-73.
145. Id. at 124 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 126.
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action brought by one of their own citizens." 14 7 He predicted that Justice
Souter's "scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day." 148 Though,
it should be noted, this view is not yet the law. The most it has carried
at any given moment is four votes as recently as 1999 when four
Justices lamented the "constitutionalized .

.

. concept of sovereign

immunity."1 49
II. INTERROGATING PRUDENCE
Self-imposed jurisdictional limits are not new, and neither is
controversy about their existence. Over the past century, some have
defended self-imposed limits as a legitimate means to avoid undue
friction with political branches, prevent hitting sensitive nerves in
public opinion, reduce instances in which courts invalidate
democratically enacted legislation, protect core constitutional values
like federalism, and preserve the judge's ability to exercise sound
judgment.15 0 Others have charged over time that the limits give power
to judges to avoid controversies in unprincipled ways, undermine the
judiciary's constitutional duty to answer constitutional questions that
arise, reduce plaintiffs' access to federal courts, and undermine
representative government by overly empowering unelected judges. 15 1
That last critique-that prudential limits undermine democratic
principles-gained the force of law recently, as a unanimous Court has
expressed skepticism that prudential limits on judicial power have a
role in the future of federal jurisdiction.1 52 This Part outlines critiques
of prudence over the past few decades and the recent, potentially
consequential ascension of the democratic critique at the Supreme
Court.
A. DebatingPrudence
Scholarship is limited about avowedly self-imposed prudential
limits. To be sure, richly descriptive, normative, and historical accounts
have been written about various doctrines that have 'prudential

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 100.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part IIA.
See infra Part II.A.
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dimensions, including standing, 153 the political question doctrine, 154
and abstention.155 Scholars have debated the merits of a robust set of
constitutionally based justiciability limits.15 6 Much more rare, however,
are discussions about self-imposed limits as a topic in and of itself.
153. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 840 (1969) (concluding that a personal interest limitation on
standing cannot rest on "historically-derived constitutional compulsions"); Heather Elliott, The
Functionsof Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008); Fletcher, supra note 38 (arguing that standing
should "simply be a question on the merits of plaintiffs claims"); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing,'
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2007) (concluding that the Court
should not require a showing of injury-in-fact where she alleges violation of a private right); Louis
L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961)
(examining standing issues related to intervention in administrative proceedings or appeals from
administrative decisions on individual rights grounds) [hereinafter Jaffe, PrivateActions]; Louis
L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1961)
(examining the standing problem presented by individuals seeking to vindicate both personal and
public rights); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1154-56 (1993) (pointing out the inadequate constitutional basis of the Lujan decision);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999) (applying
scholarship on judicial decisionmaking to the law of standing) [hereinafter Pierce, Standing];
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on
Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200 (1993) ("The majority opinion in Defenders is simply
inconsistent with the principal of judicial restraint.") [hereinafter Pierce, Judicially Imposed
Limit]; Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 (2014) (discussing the "most
interesting plaintiff' rule in the context of plaintiffs asserting nontraditional interests); Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 188-89 (1992) (reasoning that injury cannot occur solely in fact).
154. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 8; Scott Birkey, Gordon v. Texas and the Prudential
Approach to Political Questions, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1265 (1999); Grove, supra note 90; J. Peter
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988); Amanda L.
Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333 (2006). Some have sought the
eradication of the doctrine. See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual
Rights: The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127 (arguing that the doctrine
should be "abandoned at this point as a thorn in the side of separated powers, properly
understood"); Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (1985) (arguing for the elimination of the doctrine); Louise Weinberg, Political
Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 889 (1994). Louis Henkin famously
questioned whether there was any such doctrine at all. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600-01 (1976).
155. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 115, at 256 (arguing that Younger abstention
is a common law equitable principle and that "a focus on [r]emedial equitable principles requires
significant and long overdue reductions in the scope of the Younger doctrine"); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction Between "Legitimate" and
"llegitimate" Lawmaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 847 (2013); Martha A. Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071
(1974); Massey, supranote 116; Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine ofYounger v. Harris: Deference in
Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the
Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987.
156. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy"Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 320 (1979) (discussing the "shortsighted" nature
of typical "liberal" and "conservative" reactions to justiciability requirements); Fallon, supra note
36, at 663-64 (noting that the nature of requested relief influences the question of justiciability);
Monaghan, supra note 91, at 1368 (discussing the "special function" model of judicial competence);
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While discussions about prudential limits often start with
writings from the 1960s,1 57 a generation earlier, in the 1920s, Professor
Maurice Finkelstein espoused what he called "judicial self-limitation"
on the pages of the Harvard Law Review.158 Writing during the
judicially active Lochner era, Finkelstein urged judicial restraint. He
identified by way of positive example the cases of Massachusetts v.
Mellon and Frothinghamv. Mellon,15 9 wherein the Supreme Court held
that neither Massachusetts nor a group of taxpayers had sufficient
injury to challenge the popular Maternity Act.160 He catalogued
examples over multiple centuries in which courts across the globe
declined-or should have declined-jurisdiction when cases created
friction with other government officials. He contended that this
tendency toward self-restraint was "a wholesome instinct among
judges." 161
Finkelstein's observation did not go uncontested. Professor
Melville Fuller Weston responded that courts should exercise their
constitutional responsibility to hear cases, regardless of whether
rendering a decision could impinge on sensitive political matters or run
counter to public opinion.1 62 He argued that invoking terms like
"justiciability" or "political question" were actually of little assistance
in determining when a court should exercise jurisdiction.1 6 3 This was
especially true to the extent those terms purported to reflect judicial
limits that outpaced the Constitution's.1 64

Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1698, 1698-99 (1980) (defending the 'liberal" doctrine of justiciability and alleging that Brilmayer
"misconceives the 'liberal' approach to standing and associated article III doctrines" (footnote
omitted)).
157. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J.
1567, 1590-91 (1985); Kenneth Ward, The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty and Legal Realist
Perspectives of Law: The Place of Law in Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 18 J.L. & POL. 851
(2002).
158. Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1924).
159. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
160. The Act provided grants to states to create programs to protect the health of expectant
mothers and infants. Id. at 480; see also Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History,
95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1148-49 (2009) (describing the challenge to the Act).
161. Finkelstein, supra note 158, at 339.
162. Melville Fuller Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296, 333 (1925).
163. Id. at 297-99:
"What are these political questions? To what matters does the term apply? It applies to
all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is
impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction." . . . The word "justiciable" will be largely
avoided, because in its broadest sense it is legitimately capable of denoting almost any
question.

(quoting Finkelstein, supra note 158, at 344-45).
164. Id. at 332.
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A few decades later, following the landmark decision in Brown
v. Board of Education, Professor Alexander Bickel offered his
substantially more famous discussion of judicial review in The Least
Dangerous Branch.165 Like judicial minimalists before him-such as
Professor James Bradley Thayer and Justice Louis Brandeis-Bickel
expressed concern about the "countermajoritarian difficulty" that
emerges when unelected, mostly unaccountable judges strike down
popularly enacted legislation. 166 But Bickel's approach to dealing with
this difficulty differed from their approaches. Thayer had advocated
against the invalidation of legislation absent a court's confidence that
the legislation was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 167 And
Brandeis advocated for the form of constitutional avoidance for which
Justice Frankfurter later carried the mantle, wherein courts avoided
reaching constitutional questions if a suit could plausibly be resolved
on other grounds.1 68
By contrast, Bickel's influential insight is that one tool judges
have is to simply decline to decide certain cases or issues, relying on
"passive" doctrines like standing, mootness, ripeness, and the political
question doctrine. 169 When called to decide the constitutionality of a
statute, a court's options are not limited to invalidating legislation or
validating legislation, he argued. A court also "may do neither, and
therein lies the secret of its ability to maintain itself in the tension
between principle and expediency." 170 Professor Gerald Gunther
objected that Bickelian-style, self-imposed rules of justiciability "lead

&

165. BICKEL, supra note 25, at 69; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring to the federal judiciary as "the least dangerous branch"
because it controls neither the sword nor the purse).
166. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 256-57 (2002) (tracing the academic
heritage of the countermajoritarian difficulty).
167. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893) (advocating a form of highly deferential rational
basis review as a check on judicial review); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) (naming Thayer's essay "the most influential
essay ever written on American constitutional law"). As described in Part I, Justice Frankfurter
became the architect of a number of enduring abstention principles shortly thereafter.
168. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a
series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision."). Brandeis's list included the idea that "[t]he Court will not
pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.'" Id. (citing Chi.
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
169. Michael Coenen, ConstitutionalPrivileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 743-44 (2013).
170. BICKEL, supra note 25, at 69.
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either to a manipulative process, whose inherent, if high-minded, lack
of candor raises issues of its own, or to the abandonment of principle
and the involvement of the Court in judgments of expediency, as a
second-guesser of the political institutions; or, more commonly, to
both." 171
Despite this critique, as Professor Michael Coenen recently
observed, "[C]onstitutional avoidance strategies-particularly those of
the Bickelian variety-. . . remain widely utilized by the courts." 172
Indeed, Bickelian-style prudential limits on judicial power have come
to far outpace even Bickel's initial vision. Bickel's chief targets were
instances in which courts overturned acts passed by legislative bodies.
By contrast, contemporary justiciability rules counsel against deciding
cases that have nothing to do with constitutional adjudication. 1 7 3
Further, while Bickel's Least Dangerous Branch was aimed at the
Supreme Court,17 4 self-imposed limits now restrain inferior courts
too. 175

Another round of debate about the propriety of self-imposed
limits arrived a generation later. In 1984, Professor Martin Redish
challenged the notion that courts could abstain from exercising
jurisdiction that Congress expressly creates. 176 This challenge rested
largely on "democratic principles" that rendered refusing to hear cases
inconsistent "with American political theory." 17 7 Absent an
unconstitutional law, he argued, our system of majoritarian electoral
accountability vests elected representatives, not unelected judges, with
the decision to decide whether that law should take effect. 178 The failure
to entertain a case when Congress has granted jurisdiction amounts to
invalidating a democratically enacted law without warrant.
Professor David Shapiro rebutted this view by noting that
self-imposed limits are ubiquitous and entrenched. 179 Courts, he

171. Gunther, supra note 1, at 25 (quoting BICKEL, supra note 25, at 200).
172. Coenen, supra note 169, at 744; see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional
Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1225 n.95 (2011) (identifying proponents and opponents
of the more Brandeis-esque constitutional avoidance cannon of statutory interpretation).
173. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that a set of plaintiffs
lacked standing under the Endangered Species Act to challenge executive conduct); Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016), as revised May 24, 2016.
174. Indeed, the subtitle of the book was 'The Supreme Court and the Bar of Politics." See
BICKEL, supra note 25.

175. See supraPart I.
176. See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 76.
179. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 545.
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argued, employ self-imposed limitations in a wide range of
circumstances. Such limits include, among others, justiciability,
exhaustion, and abstention. As such, judicially created strictures on
jurisdiction were not only common, but had "ancient and honorable
roots." 1s0 Accordingly, "far from amounting to judicial usurpation, open
acknowledgment of reasoned discretion is wholly consistent with the
Anglo-American legal tradition." 181 As for the contention that these
limits were nonetheless democratically invalid, he urged that neither
separation of powers nor democratic legitimacy were undermined by
self-imposed principles of judicial restraint. 182 After all, a judicial "rush
to judgment, in the absence of a sufficiently concrete and immediate
controversy, may unduly shorten the time between enactment and
adjudication or may unduly broaden the questions held appropriate for
decision." 183
B. UnderminingPrudence
The charge that judicial prudence undermines democracy
achieved the force of law two years ago in Lexmark International,Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc. 184 At issue when the Court granted
certiorari was "the appropriate analytical framework for determining a
party's standing to maintain an action for false advertising under the
Lanham Act." 185 But the case morphed into something both less and
more. Less, because the Court determined that the case was not about
standing at all-and was instead about a run-of-the-mill question of
statutory interpretation. Who did Congress intend to empower to sue
for violations of the Lanham Act? And still, the case turned out to be
about more because the Court's opinion offered a path-marking
discussion of prudential standing that has already prompted significant
discussion in a leading federal courts treatise 8 6 and lower court
opinions about prudential limits on judicial power.1 87
The underlying commercial dispute involved two players. The
first was Lexmark, a producer of printers and toner cartridges.

180. Id. at 545.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 585.
183. Id.
184. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
185. Id. at 1385.
186. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 8413 ("Lexmark, a unanimous opinion, suggests that the
Court wishes to clarify, narrow, or perhaps even jettison the doctrine of prudential standing.").
187. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1273 (11th Cir. 2015) (calling
Lexmark "notabl[e]").
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Lexmark's cartridges contained microchips that made it impossible to
refill (and reuse) the cartridges when they ran out of toner. But users
could return the cartridges to Lexmark and received a monetary
"prebate" at the time of initial purchase for agreeing to do so. The
second player was Static Control Components. Static created a
microchip that mimicked Lexmark's,
thereby enabling the
remanufacture and resale of Lexmark's cartridges. Lexmark sued
Static for violating federal copyright laws, and Static countersued for a
violation of the Lanham Act. That Act bars misleading commercial
representations, and, according to Static, Lexmark misled consumers
into believing that they were required to turn over the cartridges to
Lexmark alone. 188
Throughout the litigation, both parties treated the question of
whether Static could sue Lexmark as a question of "prudential
standing." After all, leading federal courts cases had characterized the
"zone of interests" test as a prudential rule.18 9 The Supreme Court,
however, disavowed the notion that the case was about standing at all
and expressed doubt about whether prudential standing was
compatible with democratic principles. Justice Scalia's unanimous
opinion explained that Lexmark's request to dismiss Static's claim on
standing "grounds that are 'prudential,' rather than constitutional
the principle that a federal court's
[was] in some tension with . .
'obligation' to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is 'virtually
unflagging.' "190 The Court shifted the focus from "whether in [its]
judgment Congress should have authorized [the] suit, [to] whether
Congress in fact did so." 1 91 "Just as a court cannot apply its independent
policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied,
it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely
because 'prudence' dictates." 19 2 At bottom, then, the proper analysis
should center on the "scope of the private remedy created by" the
statutory
of
question
"straightforward
Act,
a
Lanham
193
interpretation."
The zone of interests test was not the only aspect of "prudential
standing" that the Court called into doubt in Lexmark. In one of the

188. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1377-80.
189. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
190. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
191. Id. at 1388.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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most important footnotes in recent federal courts jurisprudence,1 94 the
Court questioned other aspects of prudential standing. 195 Most notably,
the Court zoomed in on its "reluctance to entertain generalized
grievances." 19 6 Despite earlier cases affiliating that doctrine with
"counsels of prudence," the Court explained that "we have since held
that such suits do not present constitutional 'cases' or
'controversies. "197 Generalized grievances are barred for constitutional
reasons, not "prudential" ones.
The Court's recategorization of both the "zone of interests"
requirement and the bar against "generalized grievances" stemmed
from a similar starting point-namely, skepticism that federal
jurisdiction has or should have "prudential" dimensions. But this
common skepticism led the Court to different destinations. The "zone of
interests" test is now statutory. "Generalized grievances" is now
constitutional. To be sure, some courts have questioned whether the
distinction between a "prudential" and a statutory test is merely
taxonomical and academic in the least charitable interpretation of that
word, because Congress's role in shaping a cause of action is preserved
either way. 198 The Court's treatment of generalized grievances,
however, does the opposite: it diminishes Congress's ability to define
causes of action. 19 9 As a constitutional limit, Congress may not
transgress it.
There are multiple ways, beyond that of Lexmark, to reconcile
the tension between prudence on the one hand and the democratic
obligation to respect Congress's jurisdictional grants on the other. One
could, as Professor Martin Redish suggested, eradicate prudential
194. Young, supra note 14, at 149 ("[T]he majority's discussion may spur far-reaching changes
in how lawyers think and (especially) talk about standing.").
195. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam); DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344-46 (2006); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
198. See Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793 F.3d 1147, 1148 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015)
("[T]he substance of the test remains unchanged for the purposes of this case."); Permapost Prods.,
Inc. v. McHugh, 55 F. Supp. 3d 14, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2014) ("Nomenclature aside, the question
remains the same . . . ."). But see The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 12-3219, 2015 WL
5147749, at *40 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[Lexmark] established a new analytical framework for determining
a party's standing to bring Lanham Act false advertising claim, which abrogated our ... five-factor
test.").
199. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (holding that petitioners lacked standing, despite a statute
that provided a cause of action to all citizens). For discussion of the ways this reduces Congress's
role, see Pierce, JudiciallyImposed Limit, supra note 153, at 1200; Sunstein, supra note 153, at
189; cf. Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private Attorneys General, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 237, 245 (1999) ("[W]here a statute like a private attorney general statute grants standing,
the statute removes the prudential rules of judicial self-governance, including the zone-of-interests
requirement." (footnote omitted)).
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limitations and leave it to Congress to enact the limits that
democratically accountable bodies could support. 200 Or, as David
Shapiro suggested, one could abandon the principle that courts have an
unflagging obligation to hear cases, as the jurisdiction and discretion
are inherently intertwined. 201 But Lexmark did not adopt either of those
approaches. It treated one limit as constitutional and another as
statutory. This invites the question: Are the Court's efforts to recast
prudential limits likely to succeed in furthering the Constitution's
democratic commitment?
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING PRUDENCE: A DIALECTIC VIEW

A. Defining Dialogue
Commentators have long discussed the concept of constitutional
dialogues between the judiciary and other bodies. 202 Sometimes, the
term "constitutional dialogue" refers to the relationship between the
people and courts, especially the ways in which public opinion helps
shape judicial decisionmaking. 203 Other discussions of constitutional

dialogues center on the shared responsibility of courts and other
politically accountable branches in illuminating constitutional
ambiguities. By way of example, Professors Louis Fisher, Mark
Tushnet, and Michael Paulsen are among those who have made the case
that politically accountable branches have and should have a role in
interpreting the Constitution's ambiguous or "thin" provisions. 204 By
contrast, Professors Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer have made
a robust and unapologetic case for judicial supremacy. 205 And Professor
Dan Coenen has offered a taxonomy of "semi-substantive" rules that the

200. See Redish, supra note 155.
201. Shapiro, supra note 9; see also Elliot, supra note 153 (advocating a prudential approach
to resolving standing). Ernie Young has likewise advised that "the Court will need to recognize
that it cannot do without prudential rules entirely." Young, supra note 14, at 163.
202. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 16-32 (1982);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1789-90 (1997).

203. See Barry Friedman, Dialogueand JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 679-80 (1993)
("When judges stray too far from the mark, pressures build-in judicial appointments and in
political rhetoric-to bring them back into line. The dialogic protection is that the judiciary-or
the people-always are struggling to achieve convergence." (footnote omitted)); cf. Amanda Frost,
Defending the MajoritarianCourt, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 762.
204. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS

(1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 343-45 (1994); Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional
Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1996).

205. See

Larry

Alexander

&

Frederick

Interpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).

Schauer,

On Extrajudicial Constitutional
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Court has created to facilitate constitutional dialogue among the
political branches. 206
Even the most ambitious defenses of judicial supremacy do not
contend, however, that the politically accountable branches have no role
in giving life to the Constitution in the absence of judicial
decisionmaking. 207 Nor do they contend that courts should routinely
abandon minimalist approaches to interpreting the Constitution 208 or
crowd out other branches by reaching unnecessary constitutional
conclusions. Presumably then, proponents and opponents alike have
reason to consider the consequences for constitutional dialogue when
the Supreme Court elevates jurisdictional barriers from prudential to
constitutional status.
Methodologically, I ask two questions. First, are there examples
of federal courts and Congress engaging in meaningful dialogue in
jurisdictional cases? 2 09 Second, if there are, would constitutionalizing
the respective limits have facilitated or frustrated these dialogues? To
that end, I have identified examples of jurisdictional dialogues across
three categories: vacatur, affirmation, and instatement. By "vacatur," I
mean episodes in which Congress eliminates a prudential limit.
"Affirmation" references moments when politically accountable bodies
adopt and operationalize formerly prudential limits. And "instatement"
references Congress's adoption of a limit on judicial power in response
to judicial action or invitation.
On balance, I argue that constitutionalizing prudential limits is
most likely to lock Congress out of dialogues about how to eliminate or
operationalize
federal
jurisdictional
limits.
As
a
result,
constitutionalizing prudential limits sometimes significantly harms
congressional efforts to expand access to federal courts, especially
Congress's ability to create and enforce rights. And this pattern raises
its own set of democratic concerns. 2 10

206. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of interbranchDialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1587 (2001).
207. Alexander & Schauer, supranote 205, at 1360.
208. For brilliant, classic pieces on judicial minimalism, see Michael J. Perry, The
Constitution, the Courts, and the Question of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 84, 149-50 (1993)
(expressing skepticism of minimalism as a normative lodestar); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (defending judicial democracy-enhancing
minimalism).
209. I am grateful to Sean Farhang for this question, which he posed to me, and which I
consequentially explored.
210. See Resnik, supra note 27, at 52-64 (exploring how decreased access to courts harms
democratic precepts like equality).
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B. Vacatur
Does Congress ever exercise its authority to eliminate
prudential limits on judicial power? The short answer is yes. Laws
governing housing discrimination and state workers' rights offer
illuminating examples.
1. Fair Housing Act
The Court has held that the Fair Housing Act ("FHA")
eliminates all prudential limits on federal judicial power and allows
suits for violations of the Act to the full extent allowable under Article
111.211 One of the FHA's causes of action applies to any "person claiming
to be aggrieved," thereby evincing "a congressional intention to define
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." 2 12
The FHA's other cause of action is worded differently, stating "the
rights granted by" the Act "may be enforced by civil actions in
appropriate United States district courts." 213 The Court has held that
this broad language also permits suits that would "otherwise would be
barred by prudential standing rules." 2 14

Because many early FHA cases were brought by "testers" who
inquired about purchasing property, the elimination of prudential rules
was potentially important to the outcome of those cases. Testers had no
actual intention of purchasing the property and therefore one could
(and did) argue that the testers were vindicating the interests of
others. 215 Viewed this way, the claims run up against the prudential bar
against third-party standing. 216 In light of the FHA's language,
however, this prudential bar to jurisdiction was rejected. 217 Further, to
the extent that testers were not "'arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated' by the statutory framework," the Court
rejected this notion for the same reason. 218 Prudential rules gave way
to congressional authorization.
It seems unlikely that these cases would have come out the same
way if the bar against third-party standing were elevated to
211. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
212. Id.
213. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 122 (1979); see 42 U.S.C. § 3612
(2012) (permitting complainants to file a civil action under the Fair Housing Act).
214. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100.
215. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
216. See supra Part I.B.1.
217. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373-74.
218. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100 n.6 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976)).
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constitutional status. The "nonconstitutional" nature of these
requirements permitted Congress to abrogate them. In Lexmark, the
Court explicitly noted the uncertain status of third-party standing in a
post-Lexmark world. 219 And in lower court litigation, parties have
predictably asked courts to eliminate or recast third-party standing in
light of Lexmark. 220 Given as much, constitutionalizing third-party
standing likely would not enhance democratic values. Such an approach
would lock Congress out of discussions as to how to best enforce one of
its laws. 2 2 1 Incidentally, in this scenario, the law at issue happens to
also implicate democratic, egalitarian values: ending segregation. 222
2. Protections for State Workers
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 2 2 3 the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the
self-care provision of the Family Medical Leave Act 22 4 provide even
starker examples of dialogue through vacatur. These laws implicate a
limit on judicial power that took on an increasingly constitutional
quality during the last quarter of the twentieth century: state sovereign
immunity. And these shifts invited varying degrees of congressional
dialogue.
In Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare of
Missouri v. Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri,225 the
Court confronted the question whether state employees could sue their

219. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 ("The
limitations on third-party standing are harder to classify . . .. This case does not present any issue
of third-party standing, and consideration of that doctrine's proper place in the standing
firmament can await another day.").
220. Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 502, 505-06 (5th Cir.
2015) (rejecting an attempt to eliminate the rule); HomeAway Inc. v. City & County of San
Francisco, No. 14-CV-04859-JCS, 2015 WL 367121, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (same); Texas
v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. (In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig.), 14 F. Supp. 3d 525, 534-35
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); see also Calista Enters. Ltd. v. Tenza Trading Ltd., No. 3:13-CV-01045SI, 2014 WL 3695487, at *6 n.7 (D. Or. July 24, 2014) (recognizing that prudential standing
requirements exist outside of Article III requirements); Pringle v. Atlas Van Lines, 14 F. Supp. 3d
796, 799-800 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (same). One Eleventh Circuit opinion has identified the potentially
significant impact of treating the FHA as no longer having abrogated the third-party standing rule
in light of Lexmark. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015).
221. As Sean Farhang has compellingly written, enforcing civil rights statutes through civil
litigation, instead of administrative or executive agencies, is a contested, strategic policy choice.
See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010).

222. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (observing link between democracy and
integration).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
224. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).
225. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
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state for violations of the Fair Labor Standard Act. The Court rejected
the claim, concluding that in the absence of "clear language" from
Congress evincing an attempt to abrogate sovereign immunity, the
Court was unprepared to infer such intent. 226 Eight Justices agreed on
this point, though the majority and concurring opinions expressed
different rationales as to why. The majority noted that it was "reluctant
to believe that Congress in pursuit of a harmonious federalism desired
to treat the States so harshly" as to render them subject to private
damages lawsuits for violations of the FLSA. 22 7 And while the Court
asserted that sovereign immunity had constitutional dimensions, the
Court simultaneously suggested that Congress had power to abrogate
that immunity. "It would .

.

. be surprising in the present case to infer

that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional immunity
without . .
indicating in some way by clear language that the
constitutional immunity was swept away." 2 2 8 In addition, the two
concurring Justices and the dissenting Justice all stated that Congress
could abrogate extra-textual components of sovereign immunity
precisely because they were common law principles that sounded in
judicial restraint rather than the Constitution. 2 29
Congress heard the call for clarity 2 3 0 and, in a moment of swift
dialectical response, amended the Act to expressly include state and
local governments in 1974.231 Decades later, however, the Court
changed course, making clear that Congress could no longer subject
states to suit under legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. 232 Only legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court later held, could properly abrogate sovereign
immunity. 2 33 The Fair Labor Standards Act's abrogation provision,
therefore, eventually fell. 2 3 4 The Court's adoption of a constitution226. Id. at 285.
227. Id. at 286.
228. Id. at 285.
229. Id. at 297 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. This clear statement rule is an example both of what Dan Coenen calls "a rule of clarity"
and what Ernie Young calls a "soft" rule of procedural federalism. Coenen, supra note 206, at 160304; Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16-17, 20 (2004).
231. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (2012); Smith, supranote 122, at 1965 ("In 1974, Congress responded
by amending the Act to provide that the term employer included 'the government of a State or
political subdivision thereof [or] any agency of . .. a State, or a political subdivision of a State.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(x))).
232. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63-66 (1996).
233. Id. at 59.
234. Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 173-74 (Me. 1998), affd, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Pamela S.
Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, IrreparableInjury, and Section 1983,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1328-29 (2001) (describing this episode and its consequences for litigants);
Smith, supra note 122, at 1965 (same).
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based model (instead of a prudential or common law model) facilitated
the Court's decision to cancel out Congress's clear statement in the
FLSA. "Although the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least
in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the
Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by
constitutional design."23 5
At least two lessons can be learned from this episode. The first
is that whether a judicial limitation sounds in the Constitution does not
always tell us everything about its insulation from judicial override. For
a time, sovereign immunity's constitutional status and Congress's
power to abrogate it were coterminous. 23 6 Even after a court classifies
something as a "constitutional bar," there are still opportunities to
determine how democratic the constitutional rules will be. 2 3 7 All
jurisdictional rules are not created equal. 2 38
Second, the sovereign immunity tug-of-war nonetheless makes
plain that constitutionalizing sovereign immunity facilitated the
quieting of Congress's voice in rights-remedies dialogue. Adopting the
prudential approach advocated in thoughtful dissents and articles
would have resulted in a more relevant voice for Congress than the
current doctrine allows. Because the dissenters rejected a
"constitutionalized ... concept of sovereign immunity," they believed
Congress had the power to abrogate it.239 The Court's contrary result
disparages the role of Congress to participate in conversations about
enforcing statutory rights, even when it has been expressly invited.
Notably, too, even when Congress purports to accept the Court's
live invitation to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional nature of sovereign
immunity often gets in the way. Provisions under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the
Family Medical Leave Act's self-care provisions are among those that

235. Alden, 527 U.S. at 733.
236. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7, 19 (1989) (finding that Congress had the
power to permit suits against states under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause).
237. See e.g., Coenen, supra note 206 (demonstrating how the Court uses various doctrines to
engage other branches of government to resolve substantive constitutional questions); Young,
supra note 230 (highlighting the distinction between "hard" constitutional limits on federal power
and "soft" process-based doctrines).
238. See Bloom, supranote 9, at 990 (discussing the importance of subject-matter jurisdiction
in relation to supplemental jurisdiction and abstention); Scott Dodson, The Complexity of
JurisdictionalClarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 15-20, 24-26 (2011) (exploring competing jurisdictional
policies and the effects of rules versus standards); Dodson, supra note 9, at 1441 (explaining that
"nonjurisdictional rules can have jurisdictional effects").
239. Alden, 527 U.S. at 761.
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have fallen because Congress's record was deemed insufficient to justify
legislation under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 240 It
is not that Congress does not try. In passing the FMLA, for example,
the Senate and House Reports expressly referenced Congress's
judgment that laws banning discrimination against pregnant women
were insufficient to protect women and needed to be bolstered by a
gender-neutral leave policy that did not treat women as different from
men with health issues. 241
Still, when Congress attempts to abrogate sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power, the law
must be congruent and proportional to the constitutional evils that are
being addressed-a high bar. Evidence of state-sanctioned
discrimination is particularly important when Congress is attempting
to protect a non-suspect class. Professor Pam Karlan has associated this
line of reasoning with what she calls the "Eleventeenth Amendment":
"a court that used to see the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on
the Eleventh has come to see the Eleventh as a constraint on the
Fourteenth." 2 4 2
C. Affirmation
The dialogical relationships between federal courts and
politically accountable bodies are not always antagonistic. These
dialogues are sometimes cooperative. Politically accountable bodies
have sometimes operationalized certain formerly self-imposed
prudential limits on judicial power, providing an additional layer of
legitimacy and order. Two examples help make the point. The first is
the federal judiciary's transition from Pullman abstention to the
widespread practice of certification. 2 4 3 The other is Congress's wide240. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 44 (2012) (Family Medical Leave Act);
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities
Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act). By contrast, the Court has found that certain family leave (as opposed to self-care leave)
provisions are actionable against States. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
727-30 (2003).
241. See S. REP. NO. 101-77, at 32 (1989) ("Because the bill treats all employees who are
temporarily unable to work due to serious health conditions in the same fashion, it does not create
the risk of discrimination against pregnant women posed by legislation which provides job
protection only for pregnancy related disability."); H.R. REP. No. 99-699, pt. 2, at 22 (1986) ("Many
pregnant women have been fired when their employer refused to provide an adequate leave of
absence."); see also Coleman, 566 U.S. at 45-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the FMLA's
self-care provision provided a gender-neutral leave policy).
242. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183,
188-93.
243. See supra Part I.B.5.
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scale replacement of Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction with
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction in a manner that better reflected
actual practices of restraint.
1. From Pullman to Certification
Under traditional Pullman abstention, when a federal court
stayed or dismissed a case, the plaintiff could choose whether to litigate
both state and federal law issues in state court, or instead litigate the
state issue alone. 2 4 4 But this traditional approach is no longer
dominant. In 1959, during a speech before the Conference of Chief
Justices, a commentator drew attention to a dormant Florida statute
that permitted state courts to entertain federal courts' certified legal
questions about issues of state law. 2 4 5 Only a year later, Justice
Frankfurter-the architect of Pullman abstention-praised the statute
in an opinion for the Court, calling it an example of uncommon
prescience. 246
The number of certification statutes ballooned over the next
several decades and drew continued acclaim from commentators and
courts. 2 4 7

This

growth

is

traceable

to

the

Court's

express

encouragement of certification statutes. In addition to Justice
Frankfurter's praise, in 1974 the Court again hailed certification
because it "save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a
cooperative judicial federalism." 2 4 8 A wave of states subsequently
adopted certification statutes, and more courts used the statutes that
already existed. 249 By 1977, the leading academic voice on Pullman
abstention concluded that the doctrine made no sense when
certification was available. 2 5 0 And by the mid-1990s, the Court observed
that "[c]ertification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral

244. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964); Field, supranote
155, at 1079.
245. Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-90 (1960).
246. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) ('The Florida Legislature, with rare
foresight, has dealt with the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved
in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question
of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision."). Kurland was a previous clerk to
Justice Frankfurter. See Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 863, 863 (1986).
247.

17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§ 4248

n. 30 (3d

ed. 2016) (providing a list state statutes and appellate rules).
248. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
249. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 247, § 4248.
250. Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 592 (1977).
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device called 'Pullman abstention.' "251 As noted in Part I.B, forty-eight
states now have certification statutes, 252 though one of those states does
not use the procedure because it is incompatible with the state's
constitution. 253
Did the prudential nature of Pullman abstention help aid this
successful dialogue between the judiciary and state legislatures? The
answer to this is not as clear as instances in which Congress vacates a
prudential rule. A similar result would have presumably occurred if,
rather than endorsing and encouraging the adoption of certification
procedures, the Court had treated the adoption of these statutes as a
constitutional mandate. However, it is not apparent that type of
coercion can be called dialogue. Or perhaps the Court could have held
that it is unconstitutional to decide constitutional questions when
unclear state law stands in the way of reaching those questions. We
cannot know with certainty whether that holding would have produced
the same result. What we do know is that the Court instead invited and
encouraged state legislatures to engage in "cooperative judicial
federalism." 2 54 And the net result is a successful story of inter-systemic,
inter-branch participation in the making of modern federal
jurisdiction. 2 55
2. From "Curious" Dismissals to Certiorari
Prior to June 1988, the United States Supreme Court had
mandatory jurisdiction over a significant number of cases, contributing
to a docket of roughly 220 cases per year. 2 56 In that year, after years of
urging by the Court, a federal law eliminated most mandatory
jurisdiction, replacing it primarily with discretionary jurisdiction. 257 At
the time, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee called the move
"the most significant jurisdictional reform affecting the high court in

251. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997).
252. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 9, § 12.3; see also supra Part I.B.
253. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 12.3; see also supra note 110.
254. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
255. For additional discussions of inter-systemic governance and dialogue in other contexts,
see Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of
Modern Jurisdiction,57 EMORY L.J. 1, 30 (2007); Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic
Governance:Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 118 (2007).
256. Lynn Weisberg, New Law Eliminates Supreme Court's Mandatory Jurisdiction, 72
JUDICATURE 138, 138 (1988).

257. Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a StructuralSafeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
929, 971-78 (2013) (describing the politically contested battles that caused an eleven-year delay
in the passage of this reform).
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over 60 years." 2 5 8 Congress implemented this reform in order to ease a
high caseload burden, following the recommendations of a commission
that Chief Justice Warren Burger had assembled. 259 "Elimination of the
Court's mandatory jurisdiction, although not a panacea," the House
Judiciary Committee concluded in its Committee Report, "is a
necessary step to relieving the Court's calendar crisis." 260 Congress's
power to do this ostensibly came by way of the Exceptions Clause, which
authorizes Congress to craft exceptions to the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction (but not its original jurisdiction). 2 6 1
Still, long before Congress formally eliminated most mandatory
jurisdiction, the Court had adopted various methods to avoid
constitutional questions or cases that it did not wish to reach. In
addition to doctrines of constitutional avoidance, and doctrines of
justiciability, 2 6 2 the Court sometimes dismissed controversial cases on
the thinly reasoned ground that the case lacked a "properly presented"
or "substantial" federal question. 263 Famously, for example, in years
following Brown v. Board of Education, the Court dismissed a case
challenging a miscegenation statute in Naim v. Naim.2 6 4 In a per
curiam, the Court offered that the record and briefing was
"inadequa[te]" to assess the statute. 265 It accordingly vacated the
Virginia Supreme Court opinion that had declared an interracial
marriage void and requested that the state supreme court send the case
back to a trial court for reconsideration. When the Virginia Supreme
Court did not budge, and argued that it had no authority to remand the
case back to a trial court, 266 the Supreme Court blinked, dismissing the
case as "devoid of a properly presented federal question."2 6 7
Court records from the time reveal that this was not the actual
basis for the dismissal. 268 Instead, the Court feared that taking on the
miscegenation issue in the immediate years after Brown would
undermine the already highly fraught school integration project. In the

258. Weisberg, supra note 256, at 138.
259. Id.
260. H.R. REP. No. 100-660, at 14 (1988); accord H.R. REP. NO. 98-986, at 13-14 (1984).
261. Grove, supranote 257, at 939, 981.
262. See supra Part I.B.
263. Francis J. Ulman & Frank H. Spears, Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal
Question, 20 B.U. L. REV. 501, 505-06 (1940).
264. 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
265. Id. at 891.
266. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956).
267. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
268. Gregory Michael Dorr, PrincipledExpediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme
Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 145-55 (1998).
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views of Justices, and clerks, 269 the Court had the capital to address
school segregation. But it did not have the capital to address school
segregation and miscegenation at the same time. Justice Clark
reportedly reasoned: "[O]ne bombshell is enough." 270 The refusal to hear
the case was, in Bickelian terms, an act of (un)principled expediency.
Another example of a case dismissed for a lack of a substantial
federal question is a case that received renewed attention in recent
years: Baker v. Nelson.27 1 In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected a same-sex couple's claim that the state's prohibition on samesex marriage constituted sex discrimination. On appeal, rather than
affirming the lower court, the Court dismissed the case for "want of a
substantial federal question." 272
Naim v. Naim and Baker v. Nelson were not isolated cases with
respect to curious dismissals for lack of a "substantial" or "properly
presented" federal question. The practice was common. During the
1930s, about four hundred cases were dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question, and this continued at a similar pace in the 1940s and
1950s. 2 7 3 This pace only picked up with time; for example, this method
of dismissal, which a leading Federal Courts treatise called a "curious
device," 2 74 resulted in sixty-five dismissals during the October 1976
Term. 2 7 5 While these dismissals had some precedential support,
scholars cautioned against reading too much into what they meant
about the actual merits of the case. 2 7 6 In the words of one group of
commentators, "It is conceivable, but unlikely, that all of these cases

269. Id. at 149-50. As one clerk's memo put it, "In view of the difficulties engendered by the
segregation cases it would be wise judicial policy to duck this question for a time." Id. at 149.
270. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193 (1964).

271. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
272. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
273. Fowler V. Harper & Arnold Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the
1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 441 n.68 (1954); Ulman & Spears, supra note 263, at 503;
Comment, The InsubstantialFederal Question, 62 HARv. L. REV. 488 (1949).
274. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 16B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

4014 (3d ed.

2016).
275. Id. at n.38.
276. Comment, The Significance ofDismissals "ForWant ofA SubstantialFederal Question"*
Original Sin in the Federal Courts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 788-89 (1968) (collecting
commentators); see BICKEL, supra note 25, at 126. But see Gunther, supra note 1, at 10-13; cf.
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 771-72 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (equating a dismissal of
certiorari as improvidently granted with a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question);
Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 347 U.S. 439, 439-41 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); ROBERT L.
&

STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 277 (3d ed. 1962); Felix Frankfurter

James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1,
12-14 (1930).
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would have been decided the same way after full briefing and
argument." 277
If one accepts this view that at least a significant subset of
dismissals for want of mandatory jurisdiction are a form of prudential
limitation, the 1988 Act begins to look like an attempt to acknowledge
and operationalize those limits in a different form. Indeed, the
elimination of most forms of mandatory jurisdiction at the
encouragement of a panel assembled by a Chief Justice, and the
conversion of the Supreme Court into a body primarily driven by
discretionary review, dramatically reduced the instances of these
"curious" dismissals. 278 Despite the traditional narrative, which views
the Exceptions Clause as a potential device to strip the Court of
authority to hear important federal questions, 279 this episode helps to
demonstrate that the Clause can also be used as a device for cooperation
and dialogue. 280
Inevitably, some readers will find this resolution unsatisfying. If
the Supreme Court had mandatory jurisdiction over a case like Naim v.
Naim, should they not have decided the issue rather than engaging in
a political calculation about what the nation was ready for? 2 8 1 Indeed,
the Court's dismissal of the appellant's claim in Naim managed to make
its way into a recent symposium about candidates for the "Worst
Supreme Court Case Ever." 2 82 After all, the case involved real parties
whose rights were trampled as the Court waited for a better time.
To this, I remind that the goal of this analysis is not to defend
prudential limits against a baseline of no limits. Rather, the comparison
here is between prudential limits and constitutional limits. Two
scenarios-one historical and the other hypothetical-help clarify this
point. Under the historical scenario, the Court dismissed an appeal in
277. WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 274, § 4014.
278. Jonathan L. Entin, Insubstantial Questions and Federal Jurisdiction:A Footnote to the
Term-Limits Debate, 2 NEV. L.J. 608, 610 (2002) (noting that "the Court's docket now consists
almost exclusively of certiorari cases rather than appeals," but also noting that "there are enough
summary dispositions of appeals to cause mischief if district and circuit judges" are not familiar
with the importance of a dismissed Court appeal).
279. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1002, 1044 (2007) (arguing that, broadly construed, the Exceptions Clause would be "a threat to
judicial review"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal
Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (urging that, if the Exceptions
Clause gives Congress unlimited power over Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, then "the
Constitution . . . authoriz[es] its own destruction").

280. Grove, supra note 257, at 996-97.
281. Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525 (2012) (arguing that the case should
have been decided on the merits).
282. Id.
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a per curiam with low precedential value and then revisited the issue
eleven years later by ruling that Virginia's miscegenation statute
indeed violated the Federal Constitution. 2 8 3 Under the hypothetical
scenario, the Court actually writes an opinion upholding the
miscegenation statute on constitutional grounds, using reasoning about
the importance of deference to democratic processes and state
decisionmaking. Such a hypothetical opinion might look much like, for
illustrative purposes only, the Chief Justice's dissent in Obergefell v.
Hodges,2 84 where he contended that the Court should leave laws in place
that prohibit gay couples from marrying in part because of the need to
"exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases." 2 85 Whatever one's
views about whether the Court should have overturned Virginia's racist
law at the first opportunity, this type of constitutionally imposed
restraint may have well been worse than self-imposed, strategic
restraint. As Professor Charles Black once observed, when a court
formally upholds legislation, it has provided the law "legitimation" and
"validation." 286 That, at least, is not among the Court's potential sins in
Naim.
D. Instatement
It should be said that not all congressional dialogue on questions
of federal judicial power expands or even "hold serves" as to that power.
Consider the dialogue between courts and Congress as to the proper
scope of judicial immunity. In Pulliam v. Allen, the Court "conclude[d]
that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief
against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity." 287 This decision
was expressly based on the common law, not the Constitution itself.
And the Court invited Congress to override the decision should it have
a different view: "[l]t is for Congress, not this Court, to determine
whether and to what extent to abrogate the judiciary's common-law
immunity." 288 Congress did precisely that in the 1996 Federal Courts
Improvement Act, 2 8 9 which amended 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.290

Under that

283. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
284. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015).
285. Id.; see also id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the marriage decision a "threat to
American democracy").
286. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).

287. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984).
288. Id. at 543.
289. Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.).
290. Section 1983 provides a cause of action and set of remedies against state and local
officials who violate federal rights.
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amendment, a federal court may not award injunctive relief against
state judges unless the state judge has violated declaratory relief or
unless declaratory relief is "unavailable." 2 9 1
It is not clear that the common law basis of the Pulliam decision
facilitated
Congress's
adoption
of
the
FCIA,
however.
Constitutionalizing a limit on judicial power, as we have seen, prevents
Congress from vesting courts with certain types of power. But Congress
is presumably free to vest courts with something less than the full range
of power that the Constitution permits. 292 Suppose Pulliamhad instead
held that judicial immunity is a constitutional barrier to suit that does
not extend to prospective relief. This presumably would not have barred
Congress from adopting a statutory limit in § 1983 that prohibits forms
of prospective relief against judges. 293 Constitutionalization's greatest
impact comes when Congress attempts to expand rights and remedies,
not when Congress limits them.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALIZING PRUDENCE: A MAJORITARIAN VIEW

A. CountermajoritarianInvalidation
The countermajoritian difficulty-that is, the challenge to
democracy that attends invalidations of legislation-has long occupied
an important place in scholarship. The topic has generated so much
academic attention that it has been called an "obsession" more than
once. 294 While the term "countermajoritarian difficulty" can be traced
291. Patricia Walther Griffin & Rachel M. Pelegrin, A Look at JudicialImmunity and Its
Applicability to Delawareand PennsylvaniaJudges, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 385, 391 (1997).
292. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 40, at 300 (summarizing scholarship about the vexing
question of precisely how extensively Congress may remove federal jurisdiction before it presents
a constitutional problem). Two classic pieces of scholarship on this point are Akhil Amar's A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV.
205 (1985), and the late Daniel Meltzer's The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1569 (1990). Thoughtful, more recent works on the topic include Vicki C. Jackson,
Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-Opposition,
Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State
Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-StrippingLegislation, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 191, 237-38 (2007); and A. Benjamin Spencer, The JudicialPower and the Inferior Federal
Courts: Exploring the ConstitutionalVesting Thesis, 46 GA. L. REV. 1 (2011). It is unlikely we have
reached the end of this debate. Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress'Power
to Restrict the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1326 (1984).
293. I say "presumably" because there may be constitutional limits on Congress's ability to
deny remedies for violations of the Constitution. See e.g., Amar, supra note 292. This was among
the questions Henry Hart posed in one of the most celebrated articles in the field of Federal Courts.
Hart, supra note 279, at 1366 ("The power of Congress to regulate jurisdiction gives it a pretty
complete power over remedies, doesn't it?").
294. Friedman, supra note 166, at 157 (discussing the "obsession"); Steven L. Winter,
Indeterminacyand Incommensurabilityin ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1521 (1990)
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to Bickel, scholars before and after him have attempted to answer this
vexing question: What limits should courts impose on themselves to
avoid unwise, unnecessary, or undemocratic instances of judicial
review?
The irony is that constitutionalizing prudential rules on federal
judicial power will lead to countermajoritarian invalidations of
legislation, even in cases where the underlying merits have nothing to
do with the judicial review. The example of sovereign immunity,
discussed above, provides evidence. Because the Court has narrowly
adopted a constitutionally based, rather than prudentially based,
approach to sovereign immunity, a number of provisions in important
legislation abrogating sovereign immunity have fallen. 2 9 5 While these
decisions can and have been defended on federalism grounds, they did
nothing to check judicial review. They aided it.
An entirely sensible counter to my critique is that sovereign
immunity is so steeped in federalism concerns that it is not the most
helpful of examples. The admittedly better question is this: When
federal courts constitutionalize separation of powers based norms like
standing, does this reduce countermajoritarian invalidations of
legislative enactments? Two areas of standing doctrine lead to the
inference that constitutionalizing rules sometimes actually encourages
countermajoritarian invalidations of law. The first is the Court's line of
jurisprudence governing Congress's ability to create statutory rights
that, when violated, give rise to a judicially cognizable injury. The
second is the Court's jurisprudence outlining who may represent a
state's sovereign interests in federal court.

(same); see also Katyal, supra note 202, at 1709 ("Contemporary constitutional law is preoccupied
with the antidemocratic nature of judicial review."). As the late Daniel Meltzer succinctly and
eloquently put it, "Our attitudes about judicial review incorporate an inescapable contradiction
between the desire for judicial independence and the fear of unaccountable power." Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Judiciary's Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 433 (1989); cf. Louis Michael
Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (1988) ("[T]he search for
a normative justification for . .. judicial nonaccountability is fundamentally misguided. The
structure of the judiciary must instead be understood as simply the reflection of the subjective
preferences of our political community. It is no accident that these preferences leave us ambivalent
about judicial nonaccountability.").
295. Smith, supra note 121, at 1969. If the evenly divided court had decided this past term to
expand constitutional sovereign immunity to include some state-law claims brought in state court,

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016), this would have resulted in the
unprecedented invalidation of state jurisdictional law on this basis as well, an undemocratic
prospect that has no apparent textual basis in the Eleventh Amendment or Article IV.
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1. Statutory Standing
In Judge William Fletcher's magisterial article The Structure of
Standing, he argued that Congress should have "essentially unlimited
power" to define statutory injuries. 296 This view has accordingly been
been called "Fletcherian standing." 297 Cases consistent with that
approach include Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 2 9 8
wherein the Supreme Court held that white plaintiffs who dwelled in a
multi-unit housing complex could challenge the landlord's
discrimination against blacks because Congress had created a right to
live in an apartheid-free dwelling. More recently, in Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, 299 the Court found that a denial of a statutory
"right to information" constituted a sufficient injury to confer standing
to citizens who filed federal suit against the F.E.C. to demand
disclosures about campaign expenditures and contributions. Those
plaintiffs relied on a broad cause of action in the Federal Election
Campaign Act. The plaintiffs in neither Trafficante nor Akins suffered
a traditional common law injury.
But there are other opinions that depart from the Fletcherian
approach, cases in which the constitutionalized version of the
"generalized grievances" doctrine invalidates a congressional cause of
action. 300 Famously, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 301 plaintiffs
brought suit under a provision of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
that requires federal agencies to consult with the Department of the
Interior to ensure the agencies' actions would not jeopardize
endangered species or their habitat. Relying on the ESA's cause of
action-which allowed "any person" to obtain judicial review for
violations of the Act-the Lujan plaintiffs challenged a Department of
Interior rule that exempted agencies from the consultation requirement
when those agencies' conduct took place abroad. In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the Court held that, notwithstanding Congress's broad
cause of action, the Article III bar against generalized grievances

296. Fletcher, supranote 38, at 223-24. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuityand the Article
HI "Case" A Critique of Fletcher'sThe Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 332 (2013)
(urging instead that courts "accord such congressional determinations a strong presumption of
validity, but one that can be rebutted where other constitutional principles are jeopardized").
297. Howard M. Wasserman, FletcherianStanding, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 68
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 257 (2015).
298. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
299. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
300. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) ("But there is absolutely no basis for
making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.").
301. Id.
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prevented a citizen from filing suit over a mere statutory "procedural
injury" without more. 302
Lujan's tension with pro-democracy rhetoric has been
thoroughly described by others, especially in the immediate aftermath
of that decision. 303 Congress passed the ESA and made a policy choice
to enforce its norms through private rights of action rather than some
other means. The president signed the legislation. Whatever the merits
of Lujan from an executive-prerogative perspective, 304 the decision
nonetheless undermines that choice.
Constitutionalizing the generalized grievance prong did work in
producing this result. As noted, roughly a decade earlier, in Allen v.
Wright, the Court had described the bar against generalized grievances
as prudential. 305 But Lujan elides that characterization, describing the
bar as constitutional. 30 6 Because prudential rules are, to borrow
Professor Ernie Young's terminology, "soft,"3 07 in that they can be
abrogated by Congress, and the Article III rule asserted in Lujan is
"hard," in that Congress is treated as incapable of breaching it, the
constitutionalization of a formerly prudential rule facilitates an asapplied invalidation of a federal law. According to the Court, even "at

302. Id. at 571-72.
303. Nichol, supra note 153, at 1142-43; Pierce, Judicially Imposed Limit, supranote 153, at
1170-73 (arguing that the case invites the "agenda" of "reducing the permissible role of Congress
in government policymaking"); see also Elliott, supra note 153, at 489-90:
Contra the Scalia argument, then, one might say that a law enacted despite these
significant hurdles is particularly valuable and deserving of the Court's solicitude,
particularly when it is also subject to an effective minority veto in the executive branch
when the President decides, e.g., to direct enforcement officers not to enforce the law or
to encourage agencies to promulgate rules that do not fulfill the spirit of the law, or
when agencies become too solicitous of their regulatory constituencies.
(footnote omitted).
304. Heather Elliott, Congress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159,
203 (2011); Elliott, supra note 153, at 493 ("Standing doctrine is used to beat back congressional
efforts to use the courts against the executive branch."); Pushaw, supra note 296, at 293 ("Congress
should not be permitted to undermine the Executive Branch's Article II power by transferring the
execution of federal law, which inevitably involves discretionary determinations based on policy
considerations and resource constraints, to unelected federal judges acting at the request of anyone
with the desire and resources to litigate.").
305. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
306. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 (1992):
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large-does not state an Article III case
or controversy.

307. Young, supra note 230, at 20.
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the invitation of Congress" it could not "ignor[e] the concrete injury
requirement." 308
This opinion cannot be viewed as an outlier in light of the
Supreme Court's 2016 opinion in Spokeo v. Robins.309 At issue in that
case was whether the Federal Credit Reporting Act provided for more
causes of action than Article III will bear. The Act mandates, among
other things, that consumer reporting agencies "follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of' consumer
reports. 310 The willful failure to comply with the Act "with respect to
any [individual]" results in liability for "actual damages" or statutory
damages of $100 to $1,000 per violation, costs of the action, attorney's
fees, and potential punitive damages. 311
Spokeo, a company that operates a searchable online database
with profiles about millions of Americans, disseminated false
information about Thomas Robins on his profile. The Ninth Circuit held
that this was sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact within the
meaning of Article III. After all, Judge Diamond O'Scannlain wrote,
Robins "allege[d] that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the
statutory rights of other people." 312 Further, "Robins's personal
interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized
rather than collective." 3 1 3 The Supreme Court held, however, that this
reasoning was incomplete. Even if Robins's injury was "particularized,"
the Ninth Circuit failed to show that the injury was sufficiently
"concrete" to satisfy the Constitution's injury-in-fact requirement.
"Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
statutory violation," the Court explained. 314 The Court compared
Robins's alleged injury to a procedural one: "Robins could not, for
example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III."315
Accordingly, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's disposition, and
remanded for further analysis.
In many respects, Spokeo is a narrow opinion with hallmarks of
a compromise. The opinion was decided months after Justice Scalia, the
leading jurisdictional voice on the Right and the chief architect of
hardened standing rules, passed away. It commanded six out of eight
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016), as revised May 24, 2016.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2012).
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (2014).
Id.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
Id.
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votes, with Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor in dissent. Perhaps
that is why the Court gave little guidance in defining the word
"concrete," saying only that it means "real" and "not abstract," while
cautioning that an injury need not be "tangible" and can include "risk"
of harm. 316 And as the liberals who joined the majority opinion surely
know, the Ninth Circuit is still free to supplement its earlier analysis
with new language reasoning that falsehoods about a specific person
amount to a concrete injury with a nexus to the common law tort of
defamation. The Ninth Circuit could even simply repeat what Justice
Ginsburg said in dissent: "Robins complains of misinformation about
his education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate
representations that could affect his fortune in the job market." 317
Still, while narrow, Spokeo is significant. Unlike post-Lujan
cases like Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 318 the opinion reentrenches a departure from Fletcherian standing. Congress's creation
of a cause of action was emphatically not enough to confer a sufficient
statutory injury to meet Article III's rising concreteness requirement.
Further, in at least four ways, the requirement described in Spokeo is
more onerous than the one articulated in Lujan.
First, Lujan strongly suggested that, by adopting a damages
remedy, Congress may create a concrete, monetary injury sufficient to
clear the Article III bar. Because the ESA authorizes prospective relief
alone, that Lujan Court emphasized Congress had not "created a
concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party
for the government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious plaintiff." 319 By contrast, this reasoning is notably absent in
Spokeo, a case where Congress in fact did create a damages remedy for
victorious plaintiffs. Rather than adopt a new bureaucratic apparatus
and regime to police companies' reporting procedures, Congress
provided incentivized judicial enforcement of this federal norm. And
yet, the Spokeo Court vacated the appellate court's judgment when it
could have affirmed in light of this monetary bounty. 320
316. Id. at 1548-49; cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing's Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1283 (2013) (arguing that Article III standing is or should be present when someone suffers a loss
with a positive expected value).
317. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556.
318. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
319. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992).
320. To be sure, when Justice Scalia used the term "cash bounty" he was likely referring to
qui tam actions, in which a person can bring suit on behalf of the government even if he or she has
no connection to the case whatsoever, such as a whistleblower who witnesses someone defrauding
the government. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(discussing "the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies"). Justice
Scalia ultimately endorsed such suits as consistent with standing. Id.
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The second way that Spokeo subtly raises the Article III bar is
with respect to temporal or physical proximity to harm. In Lujan,
Justice Scalia distinguished those plaintiffs' claims from those where
"plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the
disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs
(e.g., the procedural requirement .. . for an environmental impact
statement before a federal facility is constructed next door to them)." 3 2 1
This conception of concreteness fails to make its way in to the Spokeo
decision. Robins did not challenge unreasonable procedures in a
vacuum; he challenged procedures that led to false statements made
about him in a manner that he and the world could see. Is this less
"concrete" than the injury offered as satisfactory in Lujan; that is, a
procedural barrier to a facility being built next door?
Third, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter's concurring opinion
in Lujan noted that the case involved "the articulation of new rights of
action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition." 322
By contrast, requiring that reporting agencies take reasonable steps to
avoid falsehoods bears at least a passing resemblance to the common
law tort of defamation. 323
Fourth, if Lujan is based in part on the fact that it is a suit
against the government generally, or the executive branch in
particular, Spokeo applies a cribbed version of Congress's power to
create rights beyond that context. The underlying statute and facts in
Spokeo are shorn of that concern, and the Court nonetheless imposes a
more onerous version of concreteness than the Lujan Court endorsed.
One counterpoint is that the Ninth Circuit and other lower
courts are still free to say all of this. Spokeo did not expressly overrule
the more generous aspects of Lujan. There are two responses to this
point. First, there are still potential costs to treating an easy case about
concreteness as a difficult case by vacating an imminently correct
opinion. Lower courts will possibly demand more allegations and
evidence than they did before for statutory violations, because Spokeo's
disposition signals that they should, and lower courts presumably do
not want to be reversed. Vacating easy, correct opinions, I hypothesize,
makes bad law-even if the lower court still gets it right in the end.
Given how young Spokeo is, it is too early to test this claim empirically.
321. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572.
322. Id. at 580.
323. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5260469, at *7 ("Although Congress can
create (and authorize private judicial enforcement of) new statutory rights that have no commonlaw analog, its power to act is particularly clear when such an analog exists. Common-law
defamation provides a close analog to respondent's FCRA claim.").
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But, and this is the second response, nothing about Spokeo's newfound
hardening of the "concreteness" requirement is likely to result in fewer
countermajoritarian invalidations of congressional causes of action. At
best, it does nothing on this score. And at worst, for the reasons
described, it will result in more invalidations of statutes intended to
expand access to federal courts. When the constitutionalization of
prudential rules meets the hardening of constitutional rules, democracy
is sometimes the casualty rather than the victor.
2. The State-Agent Rule
In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court held that Article III's bar
against generalized grievances stood as an insuperable barrier to the
State of California's ability to determine who could represent that
state's sovereign interests in federal court. While the California
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that a set of litigants who had
funded an initiative had authority to defend that initiative as a matter
of state law, 32 4 that ruling proved no match for the Court's robust and
constitutionalized version of the "generalized grievances" proscription.
The underlying facts of Perry are likely familiar to many
readers, but this background is central to understanding the federal
jurisdictional question the Court ultimately resolved. After the
California Supreme Court ruled that the state Constitution prohibited
the state's ban on same-sex marriage, California voters enacted
Proposition 8,325 reversing marriage equality in the state. 326 A set of
same-sex couples filed suit in federal court, contending that Proposition
8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of equal protection
and due process. 327 State officials agreed with the plaintiffs, refusing to
defend Proposition 8.328 But the federal court permitted proponents of
Proposition 8 to intervene and defend the proposition at trial.329
Following the trial, the district court sided with the plaintiffs and state
officials, issuing a groundbreaking ruling that held Proposition 8
unconstitutional. 3 3 0
That is where things became tricky as a matter of federal
jurisdiction. State officials declined to appeal the ruling that

324.
325.
CT. REV.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (2011).
Edward Stein, The Topography of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 50 FAM.
181, 188 n.36 (2012).
Id.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id. at 927.
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invalidated Proposition 8.331 They concluded that defending the law was
inconsistent with their duty to uphold the Federal Constitution. 332 This
left proponents with the task of defending the law. A central question
on appeal, then, was whether the proponents were permitted to
represent the state's interest in federal court. Because prior
jurisprudence treated the question of who could represent a state's
interest in federal court as a question of state law, 3 3 3 the Ninth Circuit
understood this question to be a complex, unclear question of state law.
As the Supreme Court had previously admonished, when a federal court
confronts unclear questions of state law that could potentially obviate
the need to reach a federal constitutional question, it should certify the
state-law question to the state court.334 The Ninth Circuit did.
A unanimous California Supreme Court held in a detailed fortypage opinion that California law permits proponents of initiatives to
defend California law when state officials refuse to do so. Just as the
California Legislature "would have authority to step in to assert the
state's interest in the validity of a statute enacted by the Legislature if
the state's executive officials have declined to defend the statute's
validity in a court proceeding," the California Supreme Court held that
"the people are no less entitled to have the state's interest in the validity
of a voter-approved initiative asserted on their behalf when public
officials decline to defend the measure." 3 3 5
The Ninth Circuit, with the California Supreme Court's opinion
in hand, held that the proponents did have standing, because California
law equipped them with the ability to represent the state under these
circumstances. 336 That the proponents did not suffer a personal injury,
and only had a grievance that one might call "generalized," was beside
the point. An attorney general need not show that she has been
personally injured to represent the state's interest in state law. Nor
must a governor or, in some cases, a state legislator. At the end of the
day, a person or set of persons must represent the state's interests in
court. And if state law assigned proponents of initiatives as appropriate
designees to serve that function, that settled the matter. The Ninth
Circuit went on to affirm that the withdrawal of previously conferred

331. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013).
332. Id.
333. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77-85 (1987).
334. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-78 (1997).
335. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1028 (Cal. 2011).
336. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) ("It is their prerogative, as independent sovereigns,
to decide for themselves who may assert their interests and under what circumstances, and to
bestow that authority accordingly.").
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benefits from an unpopular minority group had roots in animussomething the Equal Protection Clause does not countenance. 337
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that the proponents could represent the state's
interests in federal court. 338 Importantly, the Court concluded that the
proponents were not "agents" of the state, which is required under
Article III for someone to represent a state's sovereign interests in
federal court. 339 "[T]he most basic features of an agency relationship are
missing here[j" the Court reasoned. 340 Citing a comment from the most
recent Restatement of Agency, the Court observed that "[a]n essential
element of agency is the principal's right to control the agent's
actions." 341
The Court expressed concern that the initiative's proponents
"answer to no one; they decide for themselves, with no review, what
arguments to make and how to make them."3 42 This makes them
different from state officials. Whereas state officials are "elected at
regular intervals," the proponents are not elected at all. 34 3 Further,
state officials owe a fiduciary duty to the state, whereas the initiative's
proponents take no oath of office. 34 4 "They are free to pursue a purely
ideological commitment to the law's constitutionality without the need
to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or
potential ramifications for other state priorities." 3 4 5 What is more,
proponents may rack up attorney's fees without retribution from voters
and taxpayers. 3 4 6
Perryis a remarkable opinion. By this, I do not mean that Perry
was the first time the Court confronted the question of who could
represent a state's interests in federal court. Nor was it the first time
the Court expressed doubts about proponents' ability to represent a
state's interest in federal court. In Karcher v. May,3 47 the Court
concluded that state legislators lacked standing to defend a religiously
inflected law in light of an Establishment Clause violation. And in

337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 1093-94.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
Id. at 2666.
Id.

341. Id. at 2666-67 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

2005)).
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 2666.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2667.
Id.
484 U.S. 72 (1987).
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Arizonans for Official English, the Court raised questions about this
prospect. But Perry did something more.
Unlike Perry, neither Karchernor Arizonans for Official English
displaced the role of state law in determining who could defend a state
law. In Karcher, the Court expressly relied on state law to determine
whether or when the state legislators who lost their official position as
presiding members of the state legislature had standing to represent
the state's interests. 348 The Court determined that under state law, so
long as the legislators had presiding roles in the New Jersey state
legislature, they retained standing. "The New Jersey Supreme Court
has granted applications of the Speaker of the General Assembly and
the President of the Senate to intervene as parties-respondent on behalf
of the legislature in defense of a legislative enactment[,]" the Court
observed. 349 And "[s]ince the New Jersey Legislature had authority
under state law to represent the State's interests in both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, we need not vacate the judgments
below for lack of a proper defendant-appellant."a3 0
The Court affirmed this state-law centered approach in
Arizonans for Official English. The Court relied on its previous
"recogni[tion] that state legislators have standing to contest a decision
holding a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes
legislators to represent the State's interests." 351 The proponents in the
Arizonans for Official English lacked standing because they were "not
elected representatives," and the Court was "aware of no Arizona law
appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives
made law of the State." 3 52 The question whether initiative proponents
endured a sufficient injury to defend state law was a matter of
constitutional law; the question whether proponents could represent
the state's sovereign interests was described as a question of state law.
By contrast, Perry constitutionalized the question of who could
represent the state's interests. State law could not compete with Article
III's apparent requirement that to represent the state's interest, one
must be an "agent" of the state within the meaning of the
Restatement. 3 5 3 To be sure, the Court acknowledged that California had
"a sovereign right to maintain an initiative process," and that the

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
Id.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013).
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initiative's proponents had a "right . .. to defend their initiatives in
California courts, where Article III does not apply." 3 5 4 But "no matter
its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have
standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our
settled law to the contrary." 355
Perry deprives state legislatures and voters from determining
when a party may represent its interests in federal court. And it is not
clear what constitutional interests or norms are served by shutting
state lawmakers out of the business of determining who can assert a
state's interests in state court. The Court cites fears that proponents
can run up bills, including attorney's fees, and that taxpayers and
voters can do little to stop this phenomenon. 356 But why is this a matter
of federal constitutional concern, and not democratic bodies?
The Court implies at the end of the opinion that democratic
concerns about judicial restraint are driving the decision in Perry.
"[T]he Article III requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of
a federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves
vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of
separated powers." 3 5 7 Federal courts must "exercise power that is

judicial in nature," the Court offered. 358 The bar against generalized
grievances ensures "the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society," it further explained.3 59 "States cannot
alter that role simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack
standing a ticket to the federal courthouse." 360
This reasoning makes little sense. The net result of the Court's
ruling was that state legislation, enacted through direct democracy,
remained invalidated without any means for appellate review. And the
same will be true in the future any time a federal district court
invalidates a law, government officials decline to defend it, and state
law authorizes someone not deemed an "agent" to defend its interests.
The ways in which this furthers democracy are difficult to imagine. 36 1
354. Id. at 2667.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441 (2007)).
359. Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)).
360. Id.
361. It is true that Proposition 8 was ultimately declared unconstitutional, in part because it
unjustifiably discriminated against a politically unpopular group. Indeed, I have argued that it
took away a liberty interest without sufficient procedural protections. Smith, supra note 95, at
665. But Perry applies regardless of the underlying law. As the Court has recognized, some
initiatives are designed to help facilitate a better-functioning system of representative
government. See Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct.
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What is more, it is not clear what the Court means when it warns
against giving "private parties . . . a ticket to the federal court house." 362
The proponents did not file suit; the plaintiffs did. The proponents did
not choose the forum; the plaintiffs did. The proponents were seeking
to appeal a federal district court order that invalidated a state law. In
my view, Perry undermines some of the most basic guiding principles of
federal courts jurisprudence: federalism, popular sovereignty, and
judicial restraint. 363
In sum, it is far from clear how it enhances democracy to
constitutionalize the principal-agent rule. Because it makes it easier for
one federal judge to invalidate legislation with no appellate checks, and
because it makes it harder for state lawmakers to determine who can
represent states' interests in federal court, Perry does the opposite.
B. Distortion
A concern that some scholars have raised about unchecked
countermajoritarianism is that it leads to distorted policy outcomes, or
elected
officials'
debilitated
sense of
their
constitutional
responsibilities. 36 4 "Distortion" occurs when, due to a set of judicial
decisions, democratically accountable actors elect not to make policy
decisions that may come close to the constitutional line. "Debilitation"
occurs when democratically accountable actors take their constitutional
responsibilities less seriously because they believe that courts are the
final arbiters of constitutional questions. 365 Scholars from James
Bradley Thayer 366 to Mark Tushnet have raised these concerns. 367

2652, 2677 (2015) (arguing that the potential for voter initiatives may influence the actions of state
legislatures). The outcome of Perry applies to those statutes too. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed.,
Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense: The State Shouldn't Abandon Measures Passed by Voters, L.A. TIMES
(June 28, 2013), http://articles.atimes.com/2013/jun/28/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8initiatives-20130628 [https://perma.cc/U6YE-AUZE] ("[T]he long-term implications of the ruling
are disturbing. . . . I vehemently opposed Proposition 8, but I believe it deserved its defense in
court.").
362. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
363. By constitutionalizing the "principal-agent" rule of state standing, presumably the Court
not only silenced state legislatures, but also simultaneously silenced federal politically accountable
branches as well. Suppose Congress wanted to pass a law (let us call it the "Initiative Protection
Act") that affirmed states' ability to determine who could represent them in federal court. The
power of Perry is that this legislation is, presumptively, impermissible and invalid.
364. Mark Tushnet, PolicyDistortionand DemocraticDebilitation:ComparativeIllumination
of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995).
365. See id. at 247 (explaining distortion and debilitation in the context of legislatures).
366. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
367. Tushnet, supranote 364.
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In the context of congressional efforts to influence federal
jurisdiction, the historical scenario explored below suggests that
distortion is a potential problem. When Congress considers whether to
expand federal jurisdiction, it sometimes takes seriously whether it is
acting in a manner consistent with what a federal court will uphold.
And this makes some intuitive sense. Expanding jurisdiction only
works, ultimately, if courts accommodate those efforts. 368 And if
Congress is attempting to undo a limit that a court has imposed, it
would do well to signal to courts that it takes their views seriously, lest
courts ultimately use one of the many tools of self-restraint they have
to resist. 369
A look at the jolty journey of taxpayer-standing law suggests
that constitutionalizing prudence is unlikely to reduce distortion. In
Frothingham v. Mellon, 370 the Court held that a federal taxpayer,
without more, generally lacks standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal statute. But forty-five years later, in Flast
v. Cohen, the Court was called on to "decide whether the Frothingham
barrier should be lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on
the ground that it violates the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment." 371 The Court held that a taxpayer
may challenge an expenditure as a breach of the Establishment Clause.
In carving out this exception to the general bar against taxpayer
suits, the Court explored whether the barrier erected in Frothingham
"establishes a constitutional bar to taxpayer suits or whether the Court
was simply imposing a rule of self-restraint which was not
constitutionally compelled." 372 The Court observed that the prevailing
academic view is that the bar was prudential, not constitutional. 3 73
While the concluding line of Frothinghamrested on the view that the
Court should not "assume a position of authority over the governmental
acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we
368. See generally Judith Resnik, Fairnessin Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) (discussing the expansion
of the jurisdiction of federal courts).
369. See generally Part I.B (identifying prudential limits on federal judicial power).
370. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
371. 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
372. Id. at 92.
373. The Court noted in a footnote that "[t]he prevailing view of the commentators is that
Frothinghamannounced only a nonconstitutional rule of self-restraint." Id. at 96 n.6 (citing Jaffe,
Private Actions, supra note 153, at 302-03 (1961)); Paul Culp Davis, Standing to Challenge
Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 386-91 (1955); Norman Dorsen, The Arthur Garfield
Hays Civil Liberties Conference: Public Aid to ParochialSchools and Standing to Bring Suit, 12
BUFF. L. REV. 35, 48-65 (1962). But see JudicialReview: Hearingson S. 2097Before the Subcomm.
on ConstitutionalRights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 465, 467-68 (1966) (statement of
Prof. William D. Valente).
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do not possess," the thrust of the Court's actual reasoning in that case
"suggests that the Court's holding rests on something less than a
constitutional foundation." 3 7 4
The Frothingham Court's concern that a contrary rule would
open the door to considerable litigation, for example, "suggests pure
policy considerations." But the Court was skeptical that these policy
considerations had continued vitality. Changed conditions-i.e., the
heightened federal tax burden of citizens and the rise of procedural
devices like class actions and joinder-warranted "a fresh examination
of the limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court and the
application of those limitations to taxpayer suits."3 7 5
There is evidence Congress viewed the Frothingham limitation
as prudential as well-or at least those in Congress tasked with paying
the most attention to these issues. In 1966, following a rise in suits
challenging religiously oriented government expenditures, Congress
considered a bill that would have authorized taxpayers to file suits in
federal court challenging government expenditures on Establishment
Clause grounds. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a series of
hearings, seeking guidance from professors who studied federal
jurisdiction. The conclusion, codified in the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report, was that the bill was legal because the bar against taxpayer
standing was a common law or prudential doctrine rooted in selfrestraint. 376
The committee noted that if Frothingham "was grounded on
constitutional considerations, [the] legislation would be legally
impermissible" and would not be "given force and effect by the Supreme
Court." 3 7 7 But the consensus following the hearing was that "the
Frothingham decision was founded on grounds other than purely
constitutional ones." 3 7 8 In light of this prudential rule, the committee
wished to "fill[ ] the procedural gap between the First Amendment's
guarantees regarding the freedom of religion and the enjoyment of that
freedom." 3 79 The bill made it out of committee, and the full Senate on a
voice vote. It did not receive a vote in the House, but the Court's ruling
in Flast v. Cohen obviated the need for legislative intervention.
It is clear from this episode that Congress only believed itself
able to expand access to federal courts if the bar against taxpayer

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Flast, 392 U.S. at 92-93.
Id.
S. REP. No. 89-1403 (1966).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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standing was prudential, and not constitutional. And it took seriously
what the Court was likely to say on that question: holding hearings and
making a record as to why it believed it had the authority to create a
taxpayer-standing bill of this sort. The language in the report suggests
that the bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate in
large part because Congress believed that taxpayer standing
constituted a prudential rule.
None of this proves unequivocally that distortion is a problem
when it comes to constitutionalizing prudential rules. What it does help
show, however, is that it is unlikely that constitutionalization reduces
distortion. The Court has offered that constitutionalizing prudential
rules eases democratic concerns. But here, the Senate believed it could
expand access to courts for First Amendment violations in this way only
if the bar against generalized grievances was viewed as prudential.
Constitutionalizing prudential rules takes certain enforcement choices
off the table.
Despite this, as noted in Part I, the Court recently
constitutionalized taxpayer-standing doctrine, and cited democratic
norms while doing so. More relaxed standing rules would compromise
our "democratic form of government," the majority contended. 380 But if
democratic distortion is a relevant metric, this shift in doctrine is
unlikely to facilitate those democratic goals. As with the metrics of
dialogue and countermajoritarian invalidation, it may well worsen the
problem.
C. The Elysian Objection
Any discussion of countermajoritarianism and democracy is
incomplete without the voice of the late, great Dean John Hart Ely. In
Democracy and Distrust, he endorsed the view that federal courts
should generally defer to politically accountable channels and uphold
38 1
legislation when the question of its constitutionality is a close one.
Ely added, however, that there were two settings where the unchecked
deference undermines rather than fosters democracy. The first is when
a statute clogs "the channels of political change" by subverting
participation in the political process. 382 For example, a law that
eliminates the right to vote would be unconstitutional, even though
there is no unambiguous provision in the Constitution protecting that
right. The second situation that warrants close judicial scrutiny, Ely
380. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 611 (2007).
381. ELY, supranote 95.
382. Id. at 103.
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argued, is when a tyrannical majority discriminates against a discrete
and insular political minority. 383 A historically politically powerless
minority group is not well positioned, after all, to protect its own
interests in the political process.
Applying this framework to this Article, one might ask the
following question: Even if constitutionalizing prudential rules
increases countermajoritarian invalidations of legislation, are the
invalidated laws ones that clog the channels of political change or
discriminate against unpopular, powerless political minorities? This
seems unlikely. The federal laws discussed in this Article include the
Family Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Americans with
Disabilities Act, Fair Housing Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and
Endangered Species Act. It is not readily apparent that these lawsindividually or as a class-single out politically unpopular minorities
for maltreatment. Some might argue that laws like the FMLA, FLSA,
ADA, and FHA actually aid historically politically powerless minorities
like women, the disabled, the poor, and people of color. 384 And while one
of the laws discussed in this Article, Proposition 8, did harm minorities,
it bears repeating that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is transsubstantively countermajoritarian, displacing laws that help and hurt
minorities alike. Further, the causes of action in the federal laws
discussed herein do not, on their face, prevent people from participating
in the political process.
D. The Discretion Objection
What of the argument, however, that prudential rules are less
democratic than constitutional rules because prudential rules give
unchecked power to politically unaccountable judges? 385 Even if
constitutionalizing prudential limits comes at a cost to dialogue and
furthers the countermajoritarian difficulty, is it nonetheless worth it if
the alternative is equipping judges with unchecked, unaccountable
power to make "power-grabbing" policy choices?

383. Id.
384. Racial minorities and women are two groups that the Court has recognized have faced
severe historical obstacles to achieving political influence. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499
(2005) (reviewing a challenge to race-based segregations in prison cell placement); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (acknowledging that gender-based classifications must serve important
governmental objectives and be tailored to meet those interests). Recent scholarship has observed
that the poor also face obstacles to political influence or power. Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li,
Measuring PoliticalPower: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323
(2016); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, PoliticalPowerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015).
385. See generally Gunther, supranote 1.
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To this, I have two responses, developed further below. First,
prudential rules on judicial power come with varying degrees of
"rulification," to borrow Professor Fred Schauer's term.3 8 6 That is,

whatever their origins, many prudential doctrines are more rule-based
than standard-based. Further, even the approaches that look more like
standards often involve clear principles rather than unchecked
discretion with endless policy inputs. 387 Prudential limits on judicial
power are not inherently rudderless. Second, scholars have long argued,
without effective rebuttal, that even Article III justiciability rules are
influenced by policy choices,38 8 the merits, 38 9 and the balancing of
competing values. 390 The difference is that some approaches to
prudence involve a transparent, rather than obscure, weighing of
clearly stated principles. 39 1
To the first point, many prudential doctrines involve rules that
provide guidance as to the proper outcome. In the standing context, for
example, the bar against third-party standing prevents a party from
litigating the rights of others. As a prudential rule, it is subject to
exceptions, but these exceptions are relatively well-defined; whether
there is a close relationship to the real party-of-interest and whether
the third-party is hindered from advocating for herself. 3 92 The same is
true of the common law approach to sovereign immunity that some
scholars and jurists have advanced. Under the prudential approach, a
private party could not name a State as a party absent (1) consent or
(2) abrogation by Congress. 393 But that leads to an elaboration of my
second response to the discretion-objection: transparent balancing of
clear principles is at least sometimes more democratic than covert

386. Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2005); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:The JusticesofRules
and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992).
387. For whatever it is worth, these prudential doctrines are generally not accompanied by
"rules against rulification" either. That is, rules that prevent lower courts from converting a
balancing test into a strict or conjunctive test. For a discussion of this jurisprudential feature, see
Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644 (2014).
388. Pierce, Standing, supra note 153, at 1743.
389. Fletcher, supra note 38.
390. Brilmayer, supra note 156 (advocating for a transparent discussion of the principles that
undergird Article III standing, and whether those principles are present in a given case).
391. Elliott, supra note 153, at 516 (arguing that converting standing into "[a] prudential
abstention doctrine would permit the courts to adjust to the expressed views of the other branches
on the appropriate balance of separation of powers (especially in cases that would currently fail
under existing standing doctrine), while still giving the courts the power to decline to hear cases
should the abstention factors counsel such a result").
392. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991).
393. See Field, supra note 138.
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Further, one-size-fits-all

constitutional rules sometimes lend themselves to covert balancing.
The constitutional, rule-based nature of Article III standing, for
example, has not prevented that doctrine from becoming, in the words
of Professor Richard Fallon, "fragmented." 3 9 5 In a recent article, Fallon
argued that the formal Article III test for standing-injury, causation,
and redressability-is often "empty" or "bootless."396 More often, other
background considerations are doing work in the opinion. For example,
the underlying merits sometimes play a role. 3 9 7 Fallon also identified
other factors, including the nature of the parties, the type of relief
sought, and whether the case implicates national security concerns.
Consider the decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA. 39 8 In that case, American citizens challenged a provision of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allowed federal officials to
intercept communications that involve non-Americans reasonably
thought to be outside of the United States. Reversing the Second
Circuit, five Justices concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge this provision because they could not show a "certainly
impending" injury. 399 As Fallon noted, this high standard, which is
hardly uniformly applied-and indeed was not applied in a standing
case about prospective relief a mere year later-was likely driven by
national security considerations.
Compare Clapper to prudential cases in which case-specific
balancing occurs in a transparent way. In Clapper, the Court balances
concerns about the proper role of a court on national security issues, but
the formal constitutional test does not provide much room for
transparent discussion about the precise role that national security
should play. 400 A much different approach, however, can be found in
United States v. Windsor, where the Court applies what it called the
prudential doctrine of adverseness. 401 In that case, the fact that the

394. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2003)
(advocating a jurisprudence of regulatory takings characterized by clear principles-such as
protection from politically oppressive majoritarianism-instead of broad notions of "fairness").
395. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentationof Standing, 93 TEx. L. REV. 1061, 1061
(2015).
396. Id. at 1063.
397. Id. at 1070-71; see also Fletcher, supranote 38, at 223.
398. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
399. Id. at 1141.
400. See Jonathan Remy Nash, StandingDoctrineNotwithstanding, 93 TEx. L. REV. SEE ALSO
189, 201-02 (2015) (noting that to the extent there are considerations beyond formal tests that
influence the law of standing, the doctrine is not predictable unless the Court perhaps describes
those rules or gives guidance as to which of these considerations "trump others").
401. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013).
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United States and the plaintiff agreed that the Defense of Marriage Act
was unconstitutional raised the specter that the adverseness
requirement was not satisfied. Nonetheless, the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group's "sharp adversarial presentation of the issues
satisfie[d] the prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against
hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties
agree[d]."402 Also, if the Court declined to decide the issue, the "[r]ights
and privileges of hundreds of thousands of persons would be adversely
affected." 403 These competing interests are embedded in the Court's
reasoning. If courts are going to weigh considerations beyond what a
strict unyielding test technically permits, isn't it at least sometimes
better for them to be open about it?404
This is not to say that prudential rules are always a paragon of
candor. In Naim, wherein the Court declined to decide the question of
interracial marriage, the Court technically gave reasons-i.e., the
record below was inadequate; the briefing was incomplete; and the
federal question was insubstantial. As discussed, those reasons crumble
under scrutiny. A more recent example of less than candid prudential
restraint is Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. 405 There, the
Court concluded that federal courts could not engage a father's
allegation that theistic language in the Pledge of Allegiance was
unconstitutional, because doing so required resolving a threshold
question of state law about whether the father had custody of his minor
daughter. In light of available procedures like certification, this
reasoning rings of pretext. Prudential rules, then, are not always more
open and candid in every sense.
A full accounting of how to maximize prudential doctrines'
values is beyond the scope of this project, and one I intend to engage in
the future. 406 For now, examples of non-transparent prudence do not
topple the central claim. Placing a constitutional label on a prudential
doctrine does not make the doctrine more democratic. And it has
sometimes made doctrines less democratic.
402. Id. at 2688.
403. Id.
404. See generally Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1253, 1255 (2009) ("[Ifndividual policy choices are democratically legitimate to the extent that they
are supported by public-regarding explanations that could reasonably be accepted by free and
equal citizens with fundamentally different interests and perspectives."). I say "sometimes"
because Frederic Bloom has made the case that some jurisdictional lies--especially false judicial
claims of jurisdictional inflexibility-may have benefits. See Bloom, supra note 9, at 974.
405. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
406. See generally Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: JudicialStrategy in Comparative
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1 (2016) (discussing the role that timing and candor play in facilitating
dialogue from an international, comparative perspective).
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E. The MajoritarianObjection
If the Constitution is itself democratic, then doesn't it enhance
democracy to at least properly house a jurisdictional doctrine in the
Constitution? Relatedly, at a minimum, because judicial interpretation
has historically often reflected the sentiments of the American public,
is it fair to call judicial invalidation of legislation countermajoritarian
at all? On the latter, point, Professor Barry Friedman has demonstrated
that courts are often majoritarian with respect to major constitutional
rulings on issues of profound public importance.407
I offer three responses. First, the key argument here is not that
there is a total absence of jurisdictional limits to be found in the
Constitution, when one considers traditional sources of constitutional
interpretation such as text, history, or precedent. The argument is that
if one's chief rationale behind placing a constitutional limit on a
formerly self-imposed rule is democracy enhancement, this rationale,
without more, falls flat.
Second, in light of the porous, blurred, and contested nature of
the jurisdictional limits discussed herein, it would be surprising if they
are all doctrines for which traditional modes of constitutional
interpretation would always yield a clear answer. It would be even more
surprising if every doctrine the Court has traditionally called selfimposed happened to also be in the Constitution itself.
Third, an important empirical question is whether technical
jurisdictional rulings like Lexmark or even Alden generate sufficient
awareness in the public to cause the Court to respond to the public's
will on such questions. If the answer is no, this undermines the idea
that the judiciary's attentiveness to the people's views should mitigate
democratic concerns about the constitutionalization of these types of
technical jurisdictional limits.
V. CODIFYING PRUDENCE

In Lexmark, the Court treated the zone of interests test as
statutory rather than constitutional or prudential. Does treating a
formerly prudential rule as statutory facilitate democratic values?
Using a similar methodology deployed in Part III, the answer appears
to be that reading a jurisdictional limit into a statute can preserve
opportunity for dialogue, especially when Congress's views are invited.

407. See Friedman, supra note 203, at 590; see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2009).
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Further, there is no obvious countermajoritarian difficulty, as judicial
codification does not invite new rounds of judicial review. The examples
below further confirm, however, the democratic problems with
constitutionalizing prudence.
A. Vacatur and Affirmance
The tale of supplemental jurisdiction provides an example of the
political branches noticing and responding to a judicial opinion that
limited federal jurisdiction by way of statutory interpretation. Federal
district courts have original jurisdiction over, among other suits, cases
arising under federal law and cases sounding in diversity
jurisdiction. 4 0 8 But these courts also have supplemental jurisdiction
over certain state claims that arise out of the same case or controversy
as a federal claim, or (in some instances) counterclaims that are brought
by a defendant. 409 In the case law, one moment of entrenchment for this
type of jurisdiction came in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,410 which held
that pendent jurisdiction existed when a federal and state claim were
so related "that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional 'case.' 411 This test was met when the two claims "derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact." 4 12

The Court, however, narrowed the potential reach of Gibbs in
two opinions: Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger and Finley v.
United States. In Owen Equipment, the Court held that because 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity of citizenship,
supplemental jurisdiction is improper when a third-party defendant
and the plaintiff hail from the same state. Then, in Finley, in a 5-4
opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that even when the district
court has federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff may not bring
supplemental state law claims against non-diverse defendants. But the
Court reminded that
[w]hatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can
of course be changed by Congress. What is of paramount importance is that Congress be
able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the
413
effect of the language it adopts.

408. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (diversity
jurisdiction).
409. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley
and the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 446 (1991).
410. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
411. Id. at 725.
412. Id.
413. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
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Congress responded to the controversial Finley opinion-and the
Court's express invitation therein-by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which
now governs supplemental jurisdiction cases. 414 This response provides
an example of Congress vacating one limit on federal judicial power and
affirming another. On the one hand, overturning Finley, Congress
formally reinstated supplemental jurisdiction in cases where the
district court's original jurisdiction sounds in federal question
jurisdiction.4 1 5 On the other hand, consistent with Kroger, the Court
restricted a plaintiffs ability to bring state-law claims against nondiverse, third-party defendants. 4 16
Like prudential limits on power, then, interpreting a statue as
imposing a limit on jurisdiction can inspire dialogue between the
political branches and the courts. In Finley, the Court expressly spoke
to Congress's ability to reverse the opinion if democratic deliberation
inspired a different choice. And Congress did precisely that-reversing
some limits and adopting others.
Congress could not have done this had Finley adopted a
constitutional rather than a statutory or prudential rule. That is,
suppose Justice Scalia had instead held that supplemental jurisdiction
is categorically unconstitutional under Article III, under the theory that
it vests federal courts with the ability to hear claims that themselves
do not arise out of federal law, and where the parties are not diverse.
Such a hypothetical presents helpful thought experiment as to the work
that constitutionalization does in comparison to prudential rules and
judicial codification. Under a constitutional ruling, Congress's views
would have been silenced.
B. Instatement
Congress can also respond to judicial codification by attempting
to instate limits on federal jurisdiction. This is made plain by the battles
414. Cami Rae Baker, The Codificationof Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 27 TULSA L.J. 247, 249-52 (1991). Richard Freer has described aspects of the
controversy. Freer, supranote 409, at 446:
Although required only to address pendent parties jurisdiction (one of those few
remaining areas of uncertainty), the Supreme Court's broad language cast doubt on
other long-settled and, frankly, more important areas of supplemental jurisdiction.
While many observers properly worried about the continued viability of supplemental
jurisdiction, there is reason to believe that the lower courts would have dealt with the
case as it had the opinions of the 1970s, basically limiting it to its facts.
(footnotes omitted).
415. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
416. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Freer critiqued what he called the "[c]odification of Kroger" on the
ground that Kroger itself was an "unprincipled, naked antidiversity case." Freer, supra note 409,
at 460, 475.
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between Congress and courts with respect to federal courts' power to
hear the claims of indefinitely detained persons held at Guantanamo
Bay in the years following the September 11 attacks. In Rasul v.
Bush,417 the Court held that the federal statutory provision governing
federal habeas claimS 4 1 8 applied to petitioners held at Guantanamo.
Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA"), which
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to provide that "no court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . .. an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." 4 19 The new law also
granted "exclusive" jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit to review decisions
of military tribunals. 420
The Court then held, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 42 1 that this
provision did not apply to cases that were pending at the time Congress
enacted DTA. And Congress again responded, this time enacting the
Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which stripped all federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus applications of Guantanamo
detainees. And the Court too responded again. In Boumediene v. Bush,
the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus is a constitutional right
that exists unless formally suspended. 422 The Court interpreted the
MCA as something short of a formal suspension. 423 Dialogue, then, does
not always lead to congressional attempts to expand jurisdiction.
that
courts
should
means,
however,
This
hardly
constitutionalize restrictionson federal judicial power. To be sure, if the
Court had issued an early opinion in Rasul stating that the petitioners
at Guantanamo were entitled to the writ under the Constitution, that
holding would have abated Congress's attempts to restrict access to
federal courts in a potentially undemocratic manner. 424 But if the Court
had held in Rasul that the petitioners were not entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus under the Constitution, Congress would have had carte
blanche to pass laws as or even more restrictive than the MCA or DTA.
Thus, even this example lends credence to the view that

417. 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
418. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012).
419. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005).
420. Id.
421. 548 U.S. 557, 575-76 (2006).
422. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724-26 (2008). The Court also held that the writ
extended to persons held in Guantanamo Bay.
423. Id. at 788-92.
424. See Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-TerritorialConstitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 369, 391 (2007) ("[The petitions] asserted that the detentions exceeded the lawful
authority of the President and were an unconstitutional suspension of the Great Writ.").
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constitutionalizing limits on judicial power does more to prevent
congressional expansions of federal jurisdiction than congressional
attempts to restrict access to courts.
C. Undemocratic Codification
It must be said that inevitably, Congress will sometimes remain
silent in the face of judicial codification of prudential rules, whether by
choice or by inertia. And such jurisdictional restrictions accordingly
remain in place. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's
controversial, expansive presumptions against the extraterritorial
reach of federal statutes such as Title VII.425 Because restrictions of this
type limit access to courts, some readers may remain concerned about
the democratic implications of the Court discovering new jurisdictional
restrictions in federal laws. Further, to the extent these restrictions
outpace the language or intent of Congress, one could additionally
charge that this type of codification is concerning from an additional
democratic valence as well.
These concerns should not be trivialized or ignored. But as a
practical matter, it is not apparent that codification leaves Congress or
victims in a worse position than prudential rules. That is, whether we
think of the presumption against extraterritoriality, for example, as a
common law prudential limit, or as an approach to statutory
interpretation, the net result is that (1) access to justice is potentially
compromised, but (2) Congress can legally reverse the presumption.
The latter is not true of constitutional restrictions, further illustrating
the particularly acute democratic concerns that arise as when a
constitutionallabel is placed on a self-imposed judge-made doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Judicial prudence is a curious feature of federal jurisdiction,
characterized by at least two puzzling contradictions. For almost two
hundred years, a basic tenet of jurisdiction has been that federal courts
must generally exercise jurisdiction when they possess it. And yet, selfimposed limits on judicial power have, at least until recently, roared on
undeterred by these pronouncements. The other contradiction concerns
the proper place of self-imposed limits in a democracy; both proponents
and opponents of prudential limits cloak their arguments in democratic
425. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) ("Aramco"); William S.
Dodge, Understandingthe PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 86
(1998) ("What was remarkable about Aramco was not just the fact that the Court again applied
the presumption, but the apparent strength of the presumption it applied.").
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values. For proponents, prudential limits on federal judicial power
represent a chance to check politically unaccountable power. For
opponents, prudential limits empower judges to make discretionary
policy judgments that belong to democratically accountable bodies.
The Supreme Court has taken sides in this debate, signing on to
the view that judicial prudence is undemocratic, and advancing a
troubling way of handling the problem. The Court has not so much
eradicated prudential rules as it has recast them as constitutional or
statutory. The story of what this means for American democracy is still
being written, and is more uncertain in light of the death of the
incomparable Justice Scalia. But there are significant reasons to doubt
that recategorizing prudential rules will do much to facilitate
representative democracy. It is unlikely to inspire new dialogues or
mitigate the potential distorting effects of unchecked judicial
supremacy. Worse, constitutionalizing prudential limits sometimes
dampens dialogue and encourages countermajoritarian distortion.
Lurking just beyond this deontological argument rests a more
consequentialist one: constitutionalizing judicial prudence makes it
more difficult for Congress to expand access to American courts, all
while maintaining Congress's ability to restrict access. There is nothing
democratic
about
that.
When
measured
against
newly
constitutionalized limits on judicial power, American democracy is
better served by self-imposed judicial restraint, guided by transparency
and principle.
There are undoubtedly undemocratic ways for the Court to
impose prudential rules. But there are also undemocratic methods of
eliminating prudence. By converting doctrines of self-restraint into
constitutional barriers, all while adopting undemocratic ways of
understanding Article III and the Eleventh Amendment, this area of
law is on an imprudent path.

